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Introduction
The goal of behavioural economics is to improve classic microeconomic theory
by introducing motives and concepts from related fields like psychology and
sociology.
The driving paradigm of most neo-classical economic research is the con-
cept of the Homo Oeconomicus, a human who approaches all problems in
a rational and typically selfish way and who possesses boundless computa-
tional power and flawless reasoning. Despite the obvious oversimplification,
the given assumptions allow the precise analysis of a large number of com-
plex problems and have led to many interesting and often surprising findings
and theories.
While the value of constructing theoretical economic models is beyond
doubt, it is important to be aware that the simplifying assumptions made
within limit the scope of the predictions made. The assumption that per-
fectly reasonable people interact in a strictly logical way often leads to con-
clusions which bear no resemblance to real-world observations.
The role of behavioural economic research is not to abandon theoretical
research but to question and test the assumptions made by economic models,
to identify contradictions to actual observations when they occur and to
develop alternative models to capture apparent flaws in the models, or, as
one might argue, flaws in human behaviour.
Examples for such flaws include loss aversion1 and non-exponential dis-
counting2 which, despite being irrational from a theoretical perspective, seem
to be prevalent themes in human behaviour. Social preferences play a role
1Numerous experiments have shown that people value possible losses stronger than
they value possible gains. For example, most people would decline a lottery in which they
could earn or lose one Euro with equal probability. For a very detailed and exhaustive
analysis of risk-preferences in Germany see Dohmen et al. (2005).
2Many experiments indicate that people seem to have difficulties in properly evaluating
future gains and losses. Instead of using the mathematically correct exponential discount-
ing, they tend to act in a myopic way, which is often referred to as hyperbolic discounting.
For more information see for example Ainslie and Haslam (1992).
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when people interact and social norms cause them to behave in a nice way
when treated well or to reciprocate and punish their counterpart even at
their own expense3.
Furthermore humans have difficulties when dealing with complex prob-
lems, which is referred to as bounded rationality4. People tend to make cal-
culation mistakes, use rough approximations and imprecise simplifications
when facing difficult problems5.
The first three chapters of this dissertation cover three different topics
tied to behavioural economics. They connect concepts originating from psy-
chology and sociology like intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the so-called
locus of control and apply them to microeconomic problems like the optimal
effort provision in a principal-agent setting. The fourth chapter is strongly
related to computer science as it describes the development of a computer
system intended to simplify the design and conduction of economic experi-
ments. While it is the project most distant to economics, it is arguably also
the most ambitious of the four projects.
The remainder of this introduction includes short summaries of each of
the four chapters.
Chapter 1 Many decisions in life are based on a person's belief in how
much influence and control she has on her own life and her environment. A
person failing an important test, for example, can perceive this as bad luck
and fault of an ill-meaning teacher on the one hand, or as the result of a lack
of learning effort or ability on the other hand. Both ways of interpretation
can be subjectively justified to a certain degree and thus a large heterogeneity
3For more information on reciprocity see Fehr and Gächter (2000), Falk (2003) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
4For more information on bounded rationality see Rubinstein (1998).
5For example people tend to break complex problems into simple problems which they
can solve individually. Unfortunately, this often leads to flawed results which is referred
to as narrow bracketing. For more information see Read et al. (1999), Fehr et al. (2002)
and Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009).
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of this so-called locus of control belief exists within the population. This
belief is likely to have a strong impact on peoples' lives as a person who
believes that studying hard is guaranteed to benefit her in the future, for
example, will study much harder than a person who believes that her ticket
in the lottery of life has already been drawn.
Besides the heterogeneity in the locus of control belief within a popula-
tion, there is a surprising difference between countries. Americans in par-
ticular have a much stronger 'belief in a just world' than Europeans despite
the fact that the underlying environments are quite similar. In their popu-
lar paper on the subject Benabou and Tirole suggest a circular relationship
between the peoples' beliefs and the society they inhabit which supports the
between-country differences. The key idea is that people who believe that
everyone is responsible for her own life will favour laws and policies which
reduce the influence of the state and social institutions. In the resulting soci-
ety, in which taxes are low and social security is loose, individual effort yields
a high dividend, which can justify the initial beliefs as a way of motivation.
In the first chapter I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) to analyse the effect suggested by Benabou and Tirole that, ceteris
paribus, a person who believes in a just world and an individual's influence
on her life will favour parties who aim for a lower level of redistribution. I
find that the locus of control has a strong and significant effect on a person's
voting behaviour. In fact, the influence is even stronger than the effect of
income and education, which are often considered as the main determinants
for political preferences.
The results provide a new perspective to analysing political preferences,
which reveals similarities between the political parties beyond the classical
left-right scheme. On the one end of the spectrum, voters of the German
liberal and green parties are, in spite of their parties' seemingly contradictory
agendas, similar in their belief of an individual's influence on her life and her
16
surroundings. On the opposing end, the voters of far-left and far-right parties
are surprisingly similar in their belief of their lives being controlled by others.
Chapter 2 Chapters two and three of this dissertation contribute to the
research on so-called principal-agent relationships. These relationships are
characterised by a principal who pays and employs an agent in order to work
on a given task. As putting effort in the task is costly, an agent will, from a
classical perspective, work as little as possible whenever she is not observed
and does not have to fear any consequences. The principal faces the problem
that observing the agent is both costly and often impractical. In order to
motivate the agent to perform well she has to create an effective incentive
system and a rewarding work environment6.
In the 'real world' many firms offer competitive payment schemes in which
employees compete over bonuses, promotion chances and, in the worst case,
keeping their jobs. While such incentive systems create strong incentives
to exert effort at first glance, problems arise as cooperation and team work
suddenly become detrimental to individual success and selfishness or even
acts of sabotage are rewarded. Furthermore, social norms might play a role
as socially aware agents might reduce their effort in order to prevent hurting
their co-workers.
Previous work done by Bandiera et al. (2005) suggests that the latter
effect is indeed prevalent. In a field study they find that introducing a
relative payment scheme causes the observed fruit farmers, who are often
good friends, to apply strong social pressure in order to prevent each other
from performing too well.
Chapter two, which is based on joint work with Armin Falk, Leonie
Gerhards and Michael Kosfeld, analyses the effects of social norms in the
principal-agent setting. We analyse this effect by conducting a controlled
6For an analysis of the economic principal-agent problem see Grossman and Hart
(1983).
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laboratory environment using an incentivised real effort task in which we
vary both the payment scheme and the level of social interaction.
We find that both social interaction and payment system have a signif-
icant effect on effort provision. Furthermore the results suggest that, given
a certain level of social interaction, different payment systems may be opti-
mal. In a close relationship, for example, team based cooperative payment
schemes seem more advantageous whereas in anonymous environments com-
petitive schemes may yield the best performance. The results derived from
this chapter are suggestive and question many of the very competitive in-
centive systems which can be observed in the corporate world.
Chapter 3 In a typical principal-agent relationship an agent produces both
successes and failures and the principal has to decide whether and how she
should express her approval or disapproval. Many principals use explicit
praise as a way of motivation. While such positive feedback might serve
as an external reward, it also communicates to the agent that she is being
supervised and not in control herself. This might hurt both the agent's
intrinsic motivation of working on the task as well as her willingness to
cooperate7. The use of blame seems likewise questionable as its potentially
negative effect on the agent's motivation might outweigh the intended effect
of discouraging mistakes.
In chapter three I analyse the straightforward question of how a principal
should frame positive or negative feedback. I approach this question by
conducting an internet experiment in which I vary the type of feedback
subjects receive after success and failure and observe the productivity within
an incentivised real-effort task. As a proxy for personal feedback a simple
abstract smiley is displayed, which is happy upon success and sad upon
failure, as well as a few other positive and negative images.
7For example, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) show that exerting control over an agent's
decision can significantly decrease cooperation.
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From a neo-classical microeconomic perspective the framing should have
no tangible effect as the underlying effort provision problem is not affected.
However, the behavioural perspective suggests two ways in which reinforce-
ment could alter a subject's decision. First, both the costs of working on a
task and the pleasure derived from solving it are largely subjective and might
be influenced by praise and blame (hedonic effect). Second, subjects learn
about their ability to solve the task and reinforcement might influence the
learning process by magnifying the perception of positive or negative events
(computational effect).
Despite the very small treatment variation I find that providing rein-
forced feedback causes surprisingly strong and significant effects. Especially
negative reinforcement seems to have a strong effect and reduces subjects'
performance by up to 20%. Positive reinforcement has an opposing, although
much smaller effect and increases performance by about 5%. Further analysis
reveals that the main effect driving these results is a change in the perceived
fun and tediousness of working on the task. Finally, I find that high- and
low-ability subjects react in a vastly different way to positive feedback.
The results from this chapter strongly advise against providing and re-
inforcing negative feedback whenever feasible.
Chapter 4 The previous two chapters analyse questions which are ap-
proached using experiments. The use of controlled laboratory experiments
has become a vital part in behavioural economics and many other areas of
research. Well-designed laboratory experiments make it possible to break
down a complex problem in a way that allows it to be analysed in a clean
and precise way. They provide control over the information a subject re-
ceives as well as the incentive system and allow for exogenous treatment
assignment8.
8For more information on the advantages of laboratory experiments in general and in
the context of economics see Falk and Fehr (2003) and Falk and Heckman (2009).
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While classic laboratory experiments are conducted using pen-and-pencil
methods, the use of computers is on the rise. Computerised experiments offer
both theoretical advantages, like reducing the interaction between subject
and experimenter, as well as practical advantages like greatly simplifying
and accelerating the experiment conduction and the data collection process.
Furthermore many experiments, for example market and auction simulations,
provide a level of complexity and interaction which cannot reasonably be
dealt with otherwise.
In the recent years both computers and networks have become vastly
more powerful, reliable and versatile and most people in developed countries
have acquired access to the internet. Likewise, so-called multimedia capa-
bilities have vastly improved, allowing people to watch high-quality video,
listen to sound or access other types of complex information.
The Bonn Experiment System (BoXS), which I will describe in chap-
ter four, is arguably the most ambitious project approached in the process
leading up to this dissertation. The BoXS is a software system allowing
experimenters to easily design and conduct both laboratory and internet
experiments and takes advantage of modern design architectures.
From a practical perspective, the BoXS allows experimenters without
prior programming experience to design their own experiments in a relatively
easy way. The implemented BoXS Programming Language is easy to learn
due to a comprehensive documentation and allows simple experiments to be
implemented using only a few lines of code.
From a technical perspective, the BoXS is based on HTML, CSS and
Java. All the underlying technologies are platform independent and allow
the BoXS to be executed on a large variety of devices, which was verified on
different computers using the most popular operating systems Linux, Ma-
cOS and Windows. Furthermore, as mobile devices like phones and tablets
become more powerful and popular, it is likely that they will be able to
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support the BoXS in the future.
Since its conception as a simple prototype, the BoXS has been continually
developed, enhanced and presented to different scientific communities. It has
since been used in several actual laboratory and internet experiments to great
success. Chapter four describes the basic ideas and design principles driving
the development of the system, describes how the system works, offers some
guidelines for experimenters using it and provides a technical documentation




Locus of Control and Political
Preferences
1.1 Introduction
The causes of many real life events can be interpreted in different ways. The
exact same outcome, for example becoming unemployed, can be understood
as the result of lacking effort or ability by one person, while it is perceived
as bad luck or society's fault by another person. An individual's preference
to blame events on internal or external factors is called the 'locus of control'
in psychology literature.
A person's locus of control is likely to be based on observing and in-
terpreting life events as well as shaped by parents, peers and the society
in general. While an individual's resulting locus of control belief might be
biased, one would expect the average locus of control of a population to con-
verge to a similar level for all industrial countries. Interestingly, this does
not seem to be the case. Despite the similarity between European countries
and the USA, significant differences between it's peoples' locus of control
seem to persist.
Benabou and Tirole propose a model in which they conjecture how dif-
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ferent levels of locus of control can coexist. First, they argue that having an
internal locus of control and believing that effort pays off is vital for success
as it provides the necessary motivation to study and work hard. Second,
having an internal locus of control might lead people to prefer a state with
lower taxes and less social security as failure is seen as individual fault. If
these preferences are widespread and result in a leaner state, individual ef-
fort becomes more important, which makes an internal locus of control more
viable. The effect resulting from this cycle can explain persistent differences
in peoples' locus of control when compared on a cross-country level.
In this paper I use the German Socio-Economic Panel, which provides a
rich data set from representatively sampled German households, to estimate
how differences in locus of control influence a person's voting behaviour.
Using regression analyses I find that the locus of control has a significant
and strong effect on a person's political preferences as well as her voting
behaviour, which supports the assumptions made by Benabou and Tirole.
In the upcoming section I summarise related work on this subject. In
section 1.3 I describe the data and the questions used in the survey. In
section 1.4 I analyse the relation between locus of control and the likelihood
to vote as well as party preferences. In section 1.5 I use the previously
estimated models to make predictions about the likely political effects which
would result from changes in locus of control. Section 1.6 summarises the
results of this chapter.
1.2 Related Work
Several studies, for example Alesina et al. (2001), have shown that signif-
icant differences in the locus of control between different countries exist,
most notably between the US and European countries. US citizens have a
significantly stronger belief in the effect of their own actions than people
in European countries. It is hard to imagine that this difference is based
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entirely on real world differences.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) introduce a model in which they show how
different levels of belief in a just world can coexist over time. The belief in
a just world, in which hard work pays off and crime does not pay, is closely
related to having an internal locus of control, which is the topic of this paper.
The model of Benabou and Tirole assumes that people find it very hard to
motivate themselves to do the unpleasant but necessary things in their life
like working or getting education. If this is the case and people suffer from
self-control problems, a realistic view of the world might yield an ineffectively
low level of effort. In this case overestimating the effect of their own effort,
despite signals to the opposite, might be a way of people tricking themselves
into working harder and gaining an ex-post superior level of utility.
Furthermore Benabou and Tirole argue that the level of belief in a just
world is likely to have an effect on society. If people think that a world
is just in that effort pays off in success then poor people are seen as being
at fault for their own failure. In effect peoples' support for redistributive
policies is likely to decrease in favour of more market-oriented, laissez-faire
policies. If this shift in policy preferences leads to lower tax rates and less
social securities then the objective incentive to work hard increases. This in
turn leads to a higher level of optimal effort, thus supporting the original
biased beliefs.
The authors propose three ways in which people might sustain the differ-
ence between their belief and reality despite signals to the opposite. First,
they argue that 'systematic brainwashing' might be done by people benefit-
ing from laissez-faire policies. Second, individuals might settle for imprecise
and incorrect beliefs if learning is costly. Third, people may simply prefer
the belief in a just world as it is a more comforting concept.
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1.2.1 Locus of Control and Effort Provision
Intuitively, differences in the locus of control are likely to have a strong
influence on individual decision making. The effort exerted when searching
for a new job, for example, is likely to be much lower if an individual thinks
her effort does not effect the outcome and getting a good job is purely a
matter of luck.
This intuition is supported by a study by Andrisani and Nestel (1976),
who conduct a panel study in which they measure the locus of control of
about 3000 respondents and observe how variables like job satisfaction and
earnings develop afterwards. They find that a more internal locus of control
induces a higher level of effort which is correlated to wage increases. In sum-
mary, this study supports both the influence of locus of control on effort, as
well as its effect on the actual outcome which is in line with the assumptions
of the model by Benabou and Tirole.
1.2.2 Locus of Control and Policy Preferences
Benabou and Tirole suggest that having an internal locus of control leads
to a preference for lower taxes and less redistribution. Several publications
analyse the relation between beliefs and preferences both on a cross-country
level as well as on an individual level.
Alesina et al. (2001) analyse the influence of beliefs about the causes
of poverty on political preferences. They find that people who believe that
poverty is an effect of bad luck and not laziness are more likely to consider
poor people worthy of monetary gifts and are generally more likely to be
on the left side of the political spectrum. These effects were shown to be
significant in cross-country comparisons.
Fong (2001) uses results from the Gallup Poll and analyses the support
for redistribution. He finds that, unlike economic theory would predict, a
person's own income is a surprisingly poor indicator for her support for
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redistribution. Instead, a person's belief in the influences of effort, luck and
opportunities in her life seem to be pivotal. This implies that monetary
inequality does not necessarily lead to a strong demand for redistribution as
long as people feel they are in control of their life.
A comparable analysis has been done by Alesina and Giuliano (2009),
who use data from the US General Social Survey. They also find that other
factors beside income like gender, age, education and religion play an impor-
tant role to explain support for redistribution. They also find that traumata
which occurred recently have a very strong influence.
Rainer and Siedler (2008) use the German Socio-Economic Panel and
find that the preference for redistribution is not primarily determined by a
person's income but by the perceived social mobility.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 German Socio-Economic Panel and Locus of Control
The German Socio-Economic Panel is a yearly recurring questionnaire of
people living in representatively sampled German households, which is orga-
nized by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) and conducted
by Infratest1.
The most in-depth analysis of locus of control using the German Socio-
Economic Panel so far has been done by Nolte et al. (1997), who do a vast
analysis of the answers to the locus of control question block in the 1994
wave. They briefly analyse political preferences and find that people with
a more internal locus of control are more likely to vote for the liberal party
(FDP) while people with external locus of control tend to vote for the left
party (PDS). This is in line with the results I find in this chapter. It should
be noted, however, that the results from Nolte et al. are mere correlations
1For more information see Wagner et al. (2007).
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and do not account for income, gender and other factors which are likely to
play a role for predicting party preference.
Since the 1994 wave the questions in the questionnaire concerning locus
of control have been changed significantly, probably partly as a result of
the fact that Nolte et al. point out several problems with the original ques-
tions. For example, they argue that some wording issues may have interfered
with the questions as they cannot be arranged in a Guttman-scale as origi-
nally intended2. Another important difference is that the 2005 wave of the
questionnaire includes questions for the four specific components of locus of
control, namely effort, ability, luck and the influence of society, which allows
for the more in-depth analysis I do in this paper.
1.3.2 The Locus of Control Variables
In the 2005 wave of the questionnaire participants were asked to signal their
agreement to 10 statements concerning their locus of control on a 7 point
Likert-scale3. At first glance the locus of control can be viewed as a one-
dimensional concept. In order to measure this general locus of control I use
the subjects' agreement to the statement My life's course depends on me.
A person who has an internal locus of control would agree to this statement
whereas a person with an external locus of control would disagree.
On a more detailed level one can distinguish four components determining
the locus of control. These factors are luck and other people as external
factors, as well as ability and effort as internal factors. In order to measure
the first two factors I use the statements What you can achieve depends on
luck and Others make the crucial decisions in my life. For the latter ones
I use the statements Abilities are more important than effort and Success
2The idea of the Guttman scale, which was originally proposed in Guttman (1950), is
to measure a person's agreement to an issue by presenting her with a set of increasingly
more provocative statements and measure the point at which she disagrees.
3The Likert scale, the idea of which is to measure a person's agreement to a question
not dichotomously but on a gradual discrete scale, was first proposed in Likert (1932).
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Figure 1.1: Locus of control components.
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takes hard work. The distributions for these components are shown in figure
1.1.
The questionnaire also included a statement about how strongly social
conditions can be influenced through individual involvement. While this
statement does not directly belong to locus of control it is a closely related
concept and is therefore included it in the following analysis.
In general it is hard to distinguish if a person is objectively externally
controlled or if she is just perceiving her life like that. A person who has poor
education or health issues, for example, might be objectively subject to more
external control. In order to address this problem I perform multivariate
regressions which control for factors which are likely to influence the objective
locus of control.
1.3.3 Party Preferences
The question about party preference asked the subjects which political party
they favour4. There are three possible problems with this question. First,
it was possible for the subjects to select multiple parties at the same time.
Since this issue is hard to deal with in multinomial models and only applies
to 163 out of 21.105 subjects I decided to drop the corresponding observa-
tions from the analysis. Second, answering this question was optional and
many subjects did in turn not give an answer. This might be a more severe
problem as it applies to 11.781 out of 21.105 (56%) observations, especially if
this results in a remaining sample which is not representative for the actual
electorate. Third, there is no way to incentivise people participating in the
survey to reveal their preferences correctly.
The above issues might be problematic if the individual likelihood of
revealing one's true preferences is correlated with the favoured party. In
order to approach the latter two issues I compare the answers given to this
4Note that the question still contained the PDS-party which has merged with the
WASG to form the party 'Die Linke' in 2007.
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This table shows the preferred party as stated by the people within the SOEP sample
as well as the actual election results from the Bundestagswahl 2005. Source for election
results: www.bundeswahlleiter.de, Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden.
Table 1.1: Sample validity.
question to the actual results of the Bundestagswahl which was held on
October 2nd, 2005 to find out if there is a systematic misrepresentation in my
sample. A first problem with this comparison is that while the election was
held on one day, the questionnaire was done throughout the whole year. A
second problem in doing this comparison is that most subjects only selected
one party in the questionnaire whereas they have two votes in the German
electoral process, which are counted in different ways5. In effect complex
strategic considerations, which are hard to model, are likely to influence the
actual voting decision.
The results of this comparison are shown in table 1.1. I find that the
major parties SPD and CDU/CSU as well as B90/Grüne seem to be slightly
over-represented while the FDP, PDS, Republicans and other parties seem
to be under-represented. The misrepresentation is about 2% to 4% and indi-
cates that the upcoming results for the smaller parties should be interpreted
with care.
5The Erststimme (first vote) is used in a winner-takes-all format for each district. Since
smaller parties are unlikely to win in this way people may be hesitant to make their vote
ineffective by voting for them. Hence small parties are likely to be under-represented in
the first vote results. The Zweitstimme (second vote) works as proportional vote and is
not subject to this issue. However, many voters who favour a certain party combination
might vote for a smaller party with their second vote, especially if that party is likely to
end up near the five percent hurdle and the respective vote might become pivotal. For
more information on this so-called ticket splitting see Pappi and Thurner (2002).
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1.4 Results
In the first part of this section I analyse the individual propensity to par-
ticipate in an election. In the second and third part I analyse individual
political preferences on the classical left-right dimension as well as specific
party preferences.
1.4.1 Interest in Politics and Voting Behaviour
Interest in politics and the resulting propensity to vote is likely to be de-
termined by three factors. First, a person should be more likely to vote if
she feels that the current political agenda is important for her. Second, she
should be more likely to vote if she feels she can influence something. Third,
she may perceive participating in an election as a social norms, regardless of
the actual influence.
My main hypothesis for this analysis is that people who feel that they are
unlikely to have an influence on society are less likely to vote. Also, people
who think that luck and other people play a strong role should be less likely
to vote.
In the SOEP questionnaire people were asked to answer whether they
intend to participate in the next election on a 5 point scale between (will
vote) in any case and in no case. For the following analysis I dichotomize
the result and recode a person as voter if her intention is greater/equal than
3 and as non-voter if it is below 3. People who were not eligible to participate
in an election, for example because they are no German citizens as well as
participants who did not answer were excluded from the following analysis
(1886 out of 21105 observations).
I do three separate probit regressions with being a voter as the dependent
variable. Probit regressions allow the analysis of dichotomous variables and
can be estimated using modern statistics software6. All three regressions
6For more information on the probit model see Finney (1947) and Hausman and Wise
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use gender, age, education7, income, being born in the former GDR and
subjective health as controlling variables.
The results of the regressions are shown in table 1.2. In the first re-
gression I include the general locus of control as variable and find that the
corresponding coefficient is positive and highly significant (p < 0.001), indi-
cating that people with a more internal locus of control are more likely to
vote.
In the second regression I drop the general locus of control and include
the more specific locus of control questions. I find that people who believe
in the influence of luck and other people on their lives are significantly less
likely to vote. At the same time people who believe they have an influence
on society are more likely to vote (all p < 0.001).
Since it is possible that the locus of control works as a proxy for other
personal traits I do a third regression in which I include the Big Five per-
sonality measures8, which were also elicited in the 2005 wave, as well as a
measure for religiousness. I find that while some of the newly introduced
variables do have a significant influence, the qualitative results for the locus
of control coefficients do not change.
The results seem to be in line with my initial hypotheses. First, people
who believe in the influence of external factors, specifically the influence of
luck and other people on their lives, are significantly less likely to participate
in an election. Second, the perceived influence on social conditions seems to
be a strong motivator for people to vote. In summary I can conclude that
people with an external locus of control are less likely to vote and may
(1978). For a general overview over the econometric methods used in this and the subse-
quent chapters see Wooldridge (2002).
7It is generally assumed that higher education is correlated to a higher level of support
for democratic systems. For a detailed analysis for German citizens see Siedler (2009).
8The so-called Five Factor Model, which is popular among psychologists, proposes the
factors 'openness to experience', 'agreeableness', 'neuroticism', 'conscientiousness' and




VARIABLES (Probit) (Probit) (Probit)
Gender (male) 0.0449** 0.0330 0.0463**
(0.0206) (0.0210) (0.0220)
Age 0.0307*** 0.0288*** 0.0277***
(0.00339) (0.00347) (0.00352)
Age (power 2) -0.000119*** -0.000102*** -9.51e-05***
(3.49e-05) (3.58e-05) (3.62e-05)
Education: Hauptschule 0.517*** 0.540*** 0.555***
(0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0318)
Education: Realschule 0.807*** 0.790*** 0.788***
(0.0323) (0.0330) (0.0333)
Education: FHR 1.017*** 0.971*** 0.953***
(0.0551) (0.0562) (0.0566)
Education: Abitur 1.334*** 1.286*** 1.264***
(0.0383) (0.0394) (0.0397)
Income (log) 0.0591*** 0.0599*** 0.0616***
(0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0167)
Income missing 0.321*** 0.318*** 0.325***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.123)
Born in GDR -0.239*** -0.225*** -0.202***
(0.0252) (0.0258) (0.0262)
Infl. of luck (1-7) -0.0568*** -0.0569***
(0.00625) (0.00631)
Infl. of other people (1-7) -0.0264*** -0.0216***
(0.00592) (0.00608)
Infl. of own effort (1-7) 0.0363*** 0.0289***
(0.00943) (0.00991)
Infl. of own abilities (1-7) 0.0214*** 0.0137*
(0.00778) (0.00793)
Infl. on soc. (1-7) 0.0963*** 0.0886***
(0.00627) (0.00638)
Goes to church regularly 0.158***
(0.0280)
Health (1=good, 5=poor) -0.109*** -0.102*** -0.0816***
(0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0122)
Big Five: Openness 0.0244***
(0.00305)
Big Five: Conscientiousness -0.000959
(0.00398)
Big Five: Extraversion -0.00168
(0.00327)
Big Five: Agreeableness 0.00863**
(0.00364)
Big Five: Neuroticism -0.00803***
(0.00302)
High Income sample (G) 0.384*** 0.349*** 0.334***
(0.0452) (0.0459) (0.0460)
Immigrant sample (D) 0.0749 0.0611 0.0417
(0.0543) (0.0554) (0.0558)
General LoC (1=ext., 7=int.) 0.0694***
(0.00703)
Constant -1.706*** -1.641*** -1.955***
(0.132) (0.146) (0.152)
Observations 20,937 20,523 20,429
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.2: Locus of control and intention to vote.
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therefore be under-represented in elections.
1.4.2 Left-Right Voting and Locus of Control
In this section I analyse individual policy preferences on the classical left-
right dimension. The dependent variable in the following regressions is the
subjects' reported political attitude on an eleven point scale between left (0)
and right (10).
When aligning the German political parties accordingly, the parties favour-
ing more state intervention, i.e. the social democrats (SPD, mean 3.97), the
green party (B90/Grüne, mean 3.40) and the left party (PDS, mean 2.83) are
considered to be on the left wing while parties like the Christian democrats
(CDU/CSU, means 6.05 and 6.17) and the liberals (FDP, mean 5.51) are con-
sidered to be on the right, as are the nationalist parties (Rep./NPD/DVU,
mean 7.76). The distribution of the left-right preference as given by the
participants and grouped by the favoured party is shown in figure 1.2.
Following the literature described in the first section I have two main
hypotheses about peoples' preferences for redistribution. First, people who
are unemployed or earn only a small wage should favour a higher amount of
redistribution as they would benefit from it the most and hence tend to vote
for left parties. Second, people who have a more external locus of control
should favour redistribution and vote left as they perceive inequality more
as an effect of chance and not as an effect of effort.
The answer to this question, which is the dependent variable for the
subsequent regressions, is both discrete and ordered. In this special case
the use of ordinary least squares regressions is discouraged. Instead, I use
ordered probit regressions for the following estimations. The results of the
regressions are shown in table 1.3. As in the previous section I begin with
a regression including gender, age, education, income, health, GDR and the
general locus of control. I find that people with higher education are more
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(a) Distribution within parties.
(b) Mean within parties.




Gender (male) 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.159***
(10.92) (11.11) (9.79)
Age 0.00176 0.000744 -0.00254
(0.70) (0.29) (-0.99)
Age (power 2) 0.0000437* 0.0000525** 0.0000733***
(1.70) (2.03) (2.80)
Health (1=good, 5=poor) -0.0163* -0.0266*** -0.0118
(-1.88) (-3.00) (-1.28)
Born in GDR -0.344*** -0.363*** -0.340***
(-17.98) (-18.61) (-17.18)
General LoC (1=ext., 7=int.) 0.0172***
(3.11)
High Income sample (G) 0.0734*** 0.0970*** 0.101***
(2.65) (3.48) (3.62)
Immigrant sample (D) 0.0713* 0.0471 0.0372
(1.75) (1.16) (0.91)
Infl. of luck (1-7) 0.0319*** 0.0327***
(6.68) (6.81)
Infl. of other people (1-7) 0.0118** 0.0159***
(2.56) (3.36)
Infl. of own effort (1-7) 0.0546*** 0.0565***
(7.75) (7.66)
Infl. of own abilities (1-7) 0.0140** 0.0184***
(2.40) (3.12)
Infl. on soc. (1-7) -0.0347*** -0.0347***
(-7.37) (-7.24)
Goes to church regularly 0.216***
(11.00)
Big Five: Openness -0.0173***
(-7.48)
Big Five: Conscientiousness 0.0189***
(6.25)
Big Five: Extraversion 0.0138***
(5.57)
Big Five: Agreeableness -0.0230***
(-8.24)
Big Five: Neuroticism -0.00859***
(-3.84)
Controls for Education Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Income Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20180 19899 19811
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.3: Locus of control and one-dimensional political preference.
37
likely to have a leftist political attitude, as are people who were born in the
former GDR and people who do not attend church regularly. I also find that
women are more likely to vote for left parties than men, which is in line with
Schmitt (2000), who analyses voting behaviour in Europe.
I find that people with a more internal locus of control are more likely
to vote for parties on the right side of the political spectrum. Note that
while the influence of locus of control is strongly significant (p < 0.001), the
influence of income is not (p > 0.1). This result supports the results from
Fong, who also finds that income alone is no good predictor for political
attitudes.
When introducing the more detailed locus of control measures and drop-
ping the general locus of control, I find that people who believe more strongly
in the effect of their own effort (p < 0.001) and ability (p < 0.01) are more
likely to favour parties on the right side, which is in line with my hypotheses.
I also find that belief in the influence of luck seems to contribute to voting
to the right (p < 0.001). These results remain significant when I introduce
the big five in the third regression.
In summary I find that people who believe more strongly in internal con-
trol factors like effort and ability are more likely to be on the right side of the
political spectrum, which is in line with my initial hypotheses. Furthermore
income is positively correlated with right-wing-voting in all three regressions
as hypothesized, but the effect does not seem to be significant.
1.4.3 Party Preferences
In this section I take a detailed look at the German parties and analyse the
individuals voting for them. My goal is to identify the factors which make
people prefer one party over the other with special focus on the locus of
control. In order to do this I use multinomial logit regressions, which allow
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the analysis of nominal dependent variables9, with the favoured party as
dependent variable. As a baseline I use the SPD since this was the most
common choice in the 2005 questionnaire.
First, I look at the major parties in Germany who usually score above
20% in the elections. These are the social democrats (SPD) and the Chris-
tian democrats (CDU/CSU10). Next are the liberal (FDP) and green parties
(B90/Grüne), which usually score between 5 and 15%. Finally I look at the
socialist (PDS) and nationalistic parties (Rep./DVU/NPD). The regression
results for the following analysis are shown in the tables 1.3 and 1.4.
1.4.4 SPD, CDU and CSU
When comparing SPD and CDU/CSU to the other parties, I find that they
are strongest with voters who have an average income and average education.
When trying to distinguish between these parties I find that both CDU
and CSU are significantly stronger than the SPD with people who have
a higher income (p ≤ 0.01 for CDU and p ≤ 0.1 for CSU). Both CDU
and CSU are also more popular with people who attend church regularly
(both p < 0.001), which seems reasonable as the Christian parties are gen-
erally thought of as the product of the cleavage between Christian and non-
Christian citizens. Looking at the age relation I find that the SPD seems
to be stronger with middle-aged voters while CDU/CSU are stronger with
both younger and older people. For the CSU there also seems to be a gender
effect as men are significantly more likely to vote for them as opposed to the
SPD (p < 0.001). The CDU is significantly stronger with people who were
born in East Germany (p < 0.01).
When looking at the general locus of control I find that people with a
more internal locus of control favour the CDU over the SPD (p < 0.001).
9For more information on the multinomial logit model see Hausman and McFadden
(1984).
10The CSU can only be voted for in Bavaria, while the CDU can only be voted for in
the other federal states.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES CDU CSU FDP Grüne PDS Rep./DVU Others
Gender (male) 0.0365 0.409*** 0.327*** -0.525*** -0.00803 1.237*** 0.525**
(0.0550) (0.0936) (0.119) (0.0857) (0.115) (0.232) (0.237)
Age -0.0226** -0.0204 -0.0300 0.0681*** -0.135*** -0.0391 0.0603
(0.00966) (0.0159) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0215) (0.0533) (0.0512)
Age (power 2) 0.000306*** 0.000266* 0.000330* -0.00102*** 0.00119*** -0.000522 -0.000882*
(9.48e-05) (0.000153) (0.000192) (0.000211) (0.000204) (0.000639) (0.000522)
Education: Hauptschule -0.343*** 0.229 -0.591*** -1.423*** -0.427 0.993*** 0.261
(0.0971) (0.174) (0.229) (0.180) (0.277) (0.368) (0.421)
Education: Realschule 0.102 0.531*** 0.187 -0.354** -0.0341 0.998*** 0.324
(0.100) (0.178) (0.219) (0.148) (0.274) (0.361) (0.435)
Education: FHR 0.0430 0.364 0.115 0.306* 0.143 -0.631 0.213
(0.136) (0.231) (0.293) (0.182) (0.365) (0.792) (0.601)
Education: Abitur 0.00945 0.184 0.758*** 0.708*** 0.469* -1.307** -0.314
(0.101) (0.184) (0.211) (0.134) (0.265) (0.531) (0.484)
Income (log) 0.123*** 0.141* 0.126 -0.0152 -0.349*** -0.577*** -0.196
(0.0414) (0.0737) (0.0979) (0.0581) (0.0799) (0.131) (0.171)
Income missing 0.765** 0.899 0.661 -0.0897 -2.441*** -3.705*** -0.770
(0.318) (0.574) (0.764) (0.442) (0.600) (0.931) (1.262)
General LoC (1=ext., 7=int.) 0.0747*** 0.0377 0.130*** -0.0556* -0.0928** 0.0520 -0.0471
(0.0198) (0.0327) (0.0457) (0.0303) (0.0410) (0.0738) (0.0839)
Infl. on soc. (1-7) -0.110*** -0.158*** -0.125*** 0.112*** -0.0362 -0.223*** -0.244***
(0.0156) (0.0261) (0.0359) (0.0253) (0.0338) (0.0708) (0.0757)
Goes to church regularly 0.908*** 1.373*** 0.0938 0.303*** -1.708*** -0.914* 0.584**
(0.0658) (0.0974) (0.157) (0.107) (0.340) (0.516) (0.285)
Health (1=good, 5=poor) -0.0574* -0.0518 -0.0823 -0.0503 0.138** 0.319*** 0.0269
(0.0308) (0.0540) (0.0676) (0.0488) (0.0635) (0.100) (0.122)
Born in GDR 0.276*** -1.728*** -0.157 -0.150 3.269*** 1.493*** 0.661**
(0.0718) (0.241) (0.166) (0.127) (0.137) (0.241) (0.259)
Constant -0.707* -2.572*** -2.784*** -1.666*** 2.840*** 1.572 -2.677*
(0.375) (0.645) (0.834) (0.562) (0.751) (1.135) (1.481)
Observations 8897 8897 8897 8897 8897 8897 8897
R-squared . . . . . . .
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Baseline: SPD
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table shows the results of a multinomial logit regression with the preferred party as
dependent variable and the general locus of control as explanatory variable. The omitted
party is the SPD as it was the most common choice in the sample.
Figure 1.3: Locus of control and parties 1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES CDU CSU FDP Grüne PDS Rep./DVU Others
Gender (male) 0.0304 0.395*** 0.332*** -0.524*** -0.0360 1.209*** 0.531**
(0.0555) (0.0943) (0.119) (0.0866) (0.116) (0.234) (0.236)
Age -0.0252*** -0.0220 -0.0313 0.0700*** -0.131*** -0.0471 0.0608
(0.00972) (0.0159) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0219) (0.0529) (0.0509)
Age (power 2) 0.000318*** 0.000288* 0.000348* -0.00102*** 0.00116*** -0.000404 -0.000900*
(9.53e-05) (0.000153) (0.000194) (0.000216) (0.000210) (0.000634) (0.000517)
Education: Hauptschule -0.321*** 0.247 -0.559** -1.391*** -0.424 1.046*** 0.254
(0.0976) (0.175) (0.229) (0.183) (0.279) (0.372) (0.419)
Education: Realschule 0.153 0.530*** 0.180 -0.411*** -0.0553 1.044*** 0.335
(0.101) (0.180) (0.219) (0.151) (0.276) (0.371) (0.431)
Education: FHR 0.117 0.358 0.0585 0.204 0.0458 -0.278 0.260
(0.137) (0.235) (0.298) (0.185) (0.372) (0.659) (0.593)
Education: Abitur 0.0701 0.158 0.712*** 0.597*** 0.423 -1.246** -0.271
(0.102) (0.188) (0.211) (0.137) (0.270) (0.538) (0.472)
Income (log) 0.131*** 0.138* 0.112 -0.0269 -0.357*** -0.602*** -0.196
(0.0417) (0.0736) (0.0968) (0.0587) (0.0802) (0.137) (0.173)
Income missing 0.816** 0.888 0.536 -0.162 -2.457*** -3.919*** -0.782
(0.320) (0.573) (0.755) (0.447) (0.601) (0.966) (1.276)
Infl. of luck (1-7) 0.0179 -0.0693** -0.0533 -0.0824*** -0.142*** -0.0188 0.0855
(0.0167) (0.0289) (0.0357) (0.0277) (0.0378) (0.0636) (0.0734)
Infl. of other people (1-7) -0.0360** 0.00801 -0.0607* -0.0399 0.101*** 0.158*** -0.0901
(0.0159) (0.0260) (0.0365) (0.0263) (0.0330) (0.0604) (0.0710)
Infl. of own effort (1-7) 0.172*** 0.153*** 0.146** -0.195*** 0.0529 -0.0971 0.0343
(0.0265) (0.0448) (0.0589) (0.0334) (0.0559) (0.0891) (0.0964)
Infl. of own abilities (1-7) -0.00332 -0.0560* -0.0786* -0.0621** -0.00905 0.00404 -0.0619
(0.0205) (0.0333) (0.0424) (0.0307) (0.0425) (0.0759) (0.0942)
Infl. on soc. (1-7) -0.105*** -0.154*** -0.116*** 0.119*** -0.0432 -0.216*** -0.243***
(0.0157) (0.0260) (0.0363) (0.0259) (0.0335) (0.0716) (0.0762)
Goes to church regularly 0.919*** 1.398*** 0.0997 0.302*** -1.601*** -0.964* 0.598**
(0.0664) (0.0979) (0.157) (0.109) (0.339) (0.515) (0.286)
Health (1=good, 5=poor) -0.0577* -0.0547 -0.0903 -0.0178 0.154** 0.274*** 0.0557
(0.0310) (0.0541) (0.0682) (0.0492) (0.0652) (0.101) (0.117)
Born in GDR 0.264*** -1.763*** -0.178 -0.118 3.214*** 1.441*** 0.696***
(0.0728) (0.241) (0.170) (0.128) (0.138) (0.246) (0.258)
Constant -1.294*** -2.755*** -2.064** -0.195 2.168*** 2.317* -2.937*
(0.409) (0.692) (0.889) (0.592) (0.795) (1.187) (1.600)
Observations 8824 8824 8824 8824 8824 8824 8824
R-squared . . . . . . .
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Baseline: SPD
This table shows the results of a multinomial logit regression with the preferred party as
dependent variable and the four locus of control components as explanatory variable. The
omitted party is the SPD as it was the most common choice in the sample.
Figure 1.4: Locus of control and parties 2.
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On a more detailed level I find that people who believe in the influence of
effort are significantly more likely to vote for CDU and CSU (p < 0.001)
while people who believe that they have a strong influence on society are
more likely to vote for SPD (p < 0.001).
FDP and B90/Grüne
The liberal party (FDP) generally favours a laissez-faire type of economy
with less redistribution. The green party (B90/Grüne) usually has environ-
mental and humanistic goals on their agenda.
Both parties are similar in that they are more popular with highly ed-
ucated people as opposed to people with only basic education (both p <
0.001). This result is in line with Schmitt who finds that people with high
education are more likely to vote for B90/Grüne, PDS and FDP. While the
FDP seems to be more popular with men, B90/Grüne are more popular with
women and people who attend church regularly (all p < 0.01). ss When look-
ing at the general locus of control I find that people with an internal locus
of control are significantly more likely to vote for the liberals (p < 0.01),
which is in line with my hypothesis. I also find that people who vote for
B90/Grüne believe more strongly in their influence on society while I find
the opposite effect for the FDP (both p < 0.01).
PDS and Republicans/DVU/NPD
The former socialist party PDS is located on the very left side of the po-
litical spectrum. In 2007 it has merged with the WASG and is now known
as Die Linke. The nationalistic Republicans, the DVU and the NPD are
situated on the very right side of the political spectrum. Both the PDS and
the Rep./DVU/NPD are considered to be on the opposing extremes of the
German political spectrum. Interestingly enough though, there are many
similarities between these parties' voters regardless.
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First, both parties are similar in that they are popular among people
who have a relatively low income (p < 0.001). Both parties are significantly
stronger with people who were born in the former GDR (p < 0.001). Fur-
thermore both parties are more popular with people who are not religious
(p < 0.01 for PDS and p < 0.1 for Rep.) and with people who have poor
health (p ≤ 0.01). The Rep./DVU/NPD seem to be more popular with male
voters (p < 0.001) as well as with voters who have a more basic education
(p < 0.01 for Haupt- and Realschule).
When looking at the general locus of control I find that supporters of
the PDS believe less strongly in the influence of luck (p < 0.001) while
supporters of the Rep./DVU/NPD believe that they have little influence on
society (p < 0.001). Both parties are similar in that their voters believe that
other people have a strong influence on their lives (p < 0.01). This is likely
related to both parties' agendas as they generally see either rich capitalists
or immigrants as the cause for most social problems.
Summary
In summary, I find that the locus of control has a vital influence on how
people vote. As hypothesized, an internal locus of control favours right-wing
parties like CDU/CSU and FDP, while an external locus of control favours
the left-wing parties SPD, B90/Grüne and PDS. Voters of the more extreme
parties PDS and Rep./DVU/NPD believe that their lives are strongly influ-
enced by other people and that they have little influence on society.
When considering figure 1.5, which plots the coefficients estimated in the
regressions, I find that aligning the parties according to the locus of control
components enables one to distinguish between them in a more detailed way
than the classical one-dimensional left-right approach can. The perceived
influences of effort and other people seem to be two especially promising
candidates in this respect.
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This figure shows the coefficients taken from the multinomial logit regression displayed in
table 1.3. Each graph shows which parties would win (lose) voters if the respective belief
were to become stronger (weaker).
Figure 1.5: Estimated relation between beliefs and party preference.
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1.5 Effect of Changes in Locus of Control
The multinomial logit analysis in the previous section enables us to anal-
yse how peoples' voting decisions might differ if their locus of control would
change. I consider an increase/decrease of each locus of control component
as well as the log-income by one standard deviation. For the income variable
the standard deviation was calculated based on observations for which the
income was not missing. I assume that no strategic considerations bias the
individual voting decisions and that an extrapolation by one standard devi-
ation does not generate an excessive forecasting error. In table 1.6 I provide
these hypothetical voting results.
1.5.1 Income and General Locus of Control
First I consider a change in the individuals' net income. I find that as the
income increases CDU/CSU and FDP become stronger while SPD and PDS
lose votes. This effect is moderately strong. An increase of all incomes by
one standard deviation would gain CDU/CSU/FDP about 3.5 percentage
points compared to SPD/Grüne who would lose 1.6 points. Note that it is
above all the PDS and Rep./DVU/NPD who would 'suffer' politically from
peoples' increased income.
The effect of a change of the general locus of control seems to be equally
strong. It is above all CDU and FDP who would gain from a more internal
locus of control, while B90/Grüne and PDS would suffer the most. In fact
the effect on the political outcome of an overall variation in the general
locus of control is almost as strong as an equally large change (one standard
deviation) in income.
45
I simulate the effect of a change in peoples' beliefs using the previous estimation results.
This table shows the distribution of the predicted party preferences if the beliefs were to
change by one standard deviation in each direction. The political coalition which would
be most likely to win is highlighted in the rightmost two columns.
Figure 1.6: Reaction of party preferences to changes in locus of control.
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1.5.2 Detailed Locus of Control
The most significant locus of control component seems to be the perceived
effect of effort. An increase by one standard deviation would increase the
result for CDU/CSU/FDP by 4.9% while SPD/Grüne would lose 4.6%. This
result is in line with the literature in that the locus of control does have a
stronger effect on political preferences than income does.
Another important factor seems to be an individual's belief in her ability
to change social conditions. I find that SPD, B90/Grüne and PDS would
benefit from this while the other parties would lose support. Note that both
PDS and Rep./DVU/NPD benefit strongly from more pronounced beliefs in
the influence of other people.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyse the effect of the locus of control on individual
political preferences using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. I
find that the locus of control does have a strong and significant effect both
on the likelihood of participating in the political system as well as on the
political parties a person is likely to favour. In fact the effect of the locus of
control seems to be even stronger than the effect of income.
All parties want to increase the German peoples' wealth and well-being
and want to ensure that effort pays off for everyone. Interestingly enough,
however, not all parties would benefit politically from a world in which this
would be the case. Likewise, all parties propagate the democratic system
and want to give the impression that participation can make a difference
while again only some parties would really benefit if peoples' beliefs were to
change in such a way.
It is above all the parties on the very extremes of the political spectrum
who react most strongly to shifts in individual beliefs. The PDS is strong
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with people who believe that their lives are mainly determined by other,
presumably more wealthy and powerful, people. Likewise the nationalist
parties are most popular with people who believe that they are influenced
by other people, presumably immigrants, and that they have no influence on
society.
The results of this paper imply that changing peoples' preferences and
beliefs might be an effective way to change their political preferences. While
it is not clear how locus of control beliefs are formed and how strongly
they can be influenced, it seems likely that political parties might try to
change peoples' believes in their favour. Likewise organisations who regard
the popularity of extremist parties as a problem might want to focus on the




1.A.1 Locus of Control Questions
1 My life's course depends on me
2 Haven't achieved what I deserve
3 What you achieve depends on luck
4 Influence on social conditions through involvement
5 Others make the crucial decisions in my life
6 Success takes hard work
7 Doubt my abilities when problems arise
8 Possibilities are defined by social conditions
9 Abilities are more important than effort






The relation between an employer (principal) and her employees (agents) is
generally considered an incomplete contract in which the principal's ability
to monitor and control the agents is both limited and costly. One common
way for the principal to circumvent this problem is to motivate her agents
by linking their wage to their productivity. Performance dependent payment
schemes like piece rates can incentivise effort if productivity can be observed
reliably and is sufficiently correlated to the agents' effort. Payment schemes
based on team performance and revenue sharing are often used when an
individual's contribution to a project is hard to measure and values of team
work are to be emphasised. Many companies also use tournaments in which
employees compete for monetary bonuses or job promotion using their effort.
In most companies employees work together in permanent teams, meet
each other every work day and often form strong social ties. These ties
and the corresponding social pressure can play a vital role when the pay-
ment scheme incorporated by the principal interacts with social norms. In
revenue sharing schemes individual effort increases the whole team's pay-off
and the social norm of helping others enhances the effect of the monetary in-
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centives. In tournament situations individual effort decreases the co-workers'
chances to win in which case the social norm of not hurting someone else can
counteract the intended incentives. It is reasonable to assume that the mag-
nitude of these social norm effects strongly depends on the amount of social
interaction between the affected employees as people may, for example, be
more willing to hurt a complete stranger than a known person.
In this paper we analyse these effects in a clean laboratory environment
in which subjects work on a tedious cognitive real effort task for a chosen
period of time. We exogenously vary both the payment scheme and the level
of social interaction and observe both the productivity of the subjects as
well as the chosen work time. We find that social norms do have a strong
effect on a subject's work motivation and can both increase or decrease her
performance. Furthermore we find that in order for social norms to have
a significant effect social interaction before and after the actual work task
is required. In an auxiliary experiment we show that subjects who are to
assume the role of an employer are aware of the relevant social norms and a
majority is able to choose a performance maximising environment for their
imaginary employees.
In section 2.2 an overview of related literature covering payment schemes
and social norms is given. Section 2.3 describes the design of our experiment
and in section 2.4 we derive theoretical predictions for subject behaviour.
The results of our main experiment are presented in section 2.5. The auxil-
iary manager experiment as well as its results are described in section 2.6.
Section 2.7 discusses the results and concludes this chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
There are two branches of literature which are of particular interest for our
research question. The first branch analyses the effects of different payment
systems and tournament types on individual work motivation and team be-
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haviour. The second branch analyses the requirements for and the effects of
social norms using theoretical models and experiments.
2.2.1 Payment Schemes and Tournaments
Many publications analyse the incentives resulting from different payment
systems and their theoretical and practical implications on agent behaviour.
One common problem with relative payment schemes is that while they
do provide incentives to exert effort, they may as well lead to disharmony
among the employees up to the point of sabotage. When several agents are
paid according to their relative performance and effort cannot be observed,
sabotaging other agents may be more cost efficient than doing actual work.
The employer faces the dilemma that she cannot incentivise effort without
incentivising sabotage as well.
Lazear (1989) analyses how different agent types, so-called doves and
hawks, compete for a prize in an environment in which effort cannot be ob-
served and the individual output is partly influenced by luck. The hawks
differ from the doves in that their marginal sabotage costs are lower. Lazear
shows that both hawks and doves devote a significant amount of their re-
sources to sabotage their co-workers. As the hawks have lower costs of
sabotaging they spend more effort on sabotage and less effort on being pro-
ductive. In effect they free ride on the doves which are more productive.
Companies prefer the more productive dove-type agents but face the
problem that the self-selection of agents does not work. Dove-dominated
companies generate greater profits, which makes them attractive for both
hawks and doves while hawk-dominated companies are attractive for neither
type. In order to solve this problem it may be profitable for the company to
use screening mechanisms (personality testing) which allow them to distin-
guish between the types in order to prevent hawks from free riding on their
firm.
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Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) analyse the optimal effort level of agents
working under different payment schemes like gain sharing, revenue sharing
and competitive teams. They use a repeated non-real effort task and ask
their subjects how much effort they were willing to exert. They find that
significant shirking and free-riding behaviour occurs in all treatments. When
comparing the different payment schemes they find that subjects tend to pro-
vide the most effort under the relative payment systems. The contributions
were highest when the subjects were monitored and could be punished when
caught shirking. However, the probability and therefore the costs of moni-
toring had to be substantial in order to provide sufficient incentives for the
subjects to behave according to their contract.
In the real world different payment schemes exist in different business
areas and people can influence their future payment scheme to a certain ex-
tent by their job choice. Dohmen and Falk (2006) analyse the performance
of subjects in a cognitive real effort task where the subjects were allowed to
choose one out of four different payment schemes (fixed payment, piece rate,
revenue sharing and tournament). They find that the performance of sub-
jects working under a non-fixed payment scheme is significantly higher. The
driving force behind this result is that the sorting of the subjects is by no
means random and depends strongly on individual ability, self-assessment
and various preferences. High ability individuals are much more likely to
select the performance dependent schemes, which partly explains the in-
creased performance in the relative schemes. They also find that women,
risk-avoiding people and people with strong social preferences tend to be
less willing to select themselves into competitive payment schemes, which
may lead to inefficient sorting in the sense that sought-after high ability
workers might hesitate to participate.
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2.2.2 Social Norms
Norms describe types of behaviour which are widely recognised within a
society and enforced, for example by means of peer pressure. Kandel and
Lazear (1992) analyse different kinds of peer pressure and their effect on
an agent's motivation. Peer pressure can be modelled both as guilt, which
works within the agent herself, as well as shame, which requires an agent's
norm-violating behaviour to be observed and punished by others. Unlike
guilt, shame requires the co-workers to actively monitor and punish defect-
ing agents in order to become an effective motivator. They interpret social
norms as an expected effort level and social pressure as the mechanism which
supports this level as equilibrium behaviour.
Kandel and Lazear find that peer pressure can be an important motivator
for agents working under team based payment schemes. Furthermore they
show that members of a team have to be able to monitor their team-mates
in order to ensure an effective effort level. If this monitoring and punishing
process is itself costly, monitoring free riding problems may arise in suffi-
ciently large groups, which implies that social norms may be most effective
in small or medium sized teams.
Dur and Sol (2010) model an agent's utility as the sum of monetary pay-
off, effort costs and social attention received from her co-workers. Each agent
can contribute to both productive and social activities. The main feature of
the model is that investing into social ties increases the recipients' interest
in the agent's well-being and may in effect influence the recipients' future
decisions in her favour. Therefore committing to social activities may benefit
even selfish individuals as it allows them to incentivise more social behaviour
in their colleagues. They show that agents may invest too little in social ties
in the absence of economic incentives and find that appropriate payment
schemes can support the formation of social ties, which may improve both
the agents' utility and the employer's profit.
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Huck et al. (2003) present a framework which allows the analysis of situ-
ations in which both economic incentives and social norms play a role. The
main feature of their framework is a social utility function which depends
on the externalities caused and received by an agent. Externalities are de-
fined as the loss/gain in utility caused in another agent given an action as
compared to the utility which would have been caused by the socially op-
timal action. They show that social norms can both increase or decrease a
rational agent's optimal effort. Furthermore, even situations with multiple
equilibria may arise, which they demonstrate using a public good game in
which both a low and a high effort level can be maintained. The framework
they introduce is applied in the theoretical section 2.4 of this paper.
2.2.3 Experimental Evidence for Social Norms
Several publications analyse the effect of social norms and the conditions
required for them to work.
Falk and Ichino (2006) analyse how an agent's effort depends on peer
pressure using an experiment employing a manual real effort task involving
the packaging of envelopes. In the baseline treatment subjects work alone
and have no information about other subjects' performance. In two further
treatments the subjects could see a small transparent box supposedly con-
taining the piles of envelopes produced by previous subjects on their desk.
They find that this pile size seems to serve as a reference point for the sub-
jects as a high pile increases the average performance as compared to the
baseline while a low pile decreases performance. Finally, in a forth treatment
two subjects work in the same room at the same time, which is be shown
to significantly increase the average subject performance. The chosen treat-
ments are interesting in that they show that both the presence of another
person and the mere indication of another persons' performance are sufficient
to influence a subject's effort decision.
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Krupka and Weber (2009) analyse the conditions necessary for social
norms to have an effect. They conduct a laboratory experiment in which
subjects play an incentivised dictator game allowing them to choose be-
tween social and selfish actions. Besides the baseline treatment, in which no
information and no additional information is provided, they employ two so-
called focusing treatments, in which the subjects are asked how they think
other subjects decide (descriptive focus) or how one should decide (injunc-
tive focus), as well as an informational treatment in which subjects receive
information on actual previous subjects' decisions. They find that all three
treatments yield a cooperation rate which is significantly higher than in the
baseline treatment. Cooperation was highest in the injunctive treatment in
which subjects should describe how one should behave. The main result is
that it seems to be necessary to make subjects reflect about social norms for
them to be effective.
Gächter and Fehr (1999) analyse how social interaction influences cooper-
ation by letting subjects play a repeated public good game and exogenously
changing the interaction before and after the game. In the anonymous base-
line treatment subjects do not see each other neither before nor after the
game and are therefore playing against complete strangers. In a group iden-
tity treatment and a social exchange treatment subjects meet before or after
the game. Finally in a forth treatment subjects meet before and after the
game. Their main result is that the effect of the social norms supporting the
cooperation is by far the strongest in the treatment in which the subjects
meet twice. Meeting only before or after the game seems to be insufficient
for creating a contribution level which is substantially above the anonymous
baseline. A questionnaire which was conducted alongside the experiment
indicates that social pressure seems to be the driving force behind the coop-
eration as many subjects reportedly fear being revealed as a free rider.
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Bandiera et al. (2005) are, to our knowledge, so far the only researchers
to analyse the effects of different payment systems and effort in a non-
laboratory environment over a longer period of time. They cooperate with a
UK fruit farm which allows them to exogenously change their workers' pay-
ment scheme from a relative payment scheme to a piece rate scheme while
maintaining the marginal pay-off effects. A relative payment scheme as em-
ployed by the fruit farm inherits the problem that each worker's effort creates
negative externalities on her co-workers. In an environment in which strong
ties between the workers exist, they may internalise these externalities, ei-
ther because of feeling sympathy or because of fearing social retribution.
They find that the change towards a piece rate vastly increases the workers'
performance and argue that this effect can be explained by the fact that the
negative externalities are eliminated by the exogenous change and the social
norms inhibiting the workers' productivity are made irrelevant. In order to
analyse the effect of social pressure they furthermore differentiate between
the harvesting of low growing fruit, which allow for easy co-worker monitor-
ing, as well as dense high shrubs, which may conceal individual performance.
They find that shrub size does matter as the treatment difference is strongest
for 'high visibility' fruit.
In summary the related literature indicates that social norms can signif-
icantly increase or decrease the agents' work motivation in the presence of
externalities. The magnitude of this effect seems to depend on the social
distance as interaction before, during or after the effort decision seems to be
necessary for social pressure to be effective.
2.3 Experiment Design
Our experiment consists of a real effort task, which we use to measure a
subject's work motivation, and several questionnaires, both of which are
described in detail below. We employ six different treatments which differ
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in the level of social interaction (separated or together) and in the payment
scheme (piece rate, team payment, relative payment).
2.3.1 Overview and Time Line
The basic set-up of the experiment is as follows:
• Upon arrival, each subject is welcomed and led to an individual room.
(vacated offices in Frankfurt, empty lecture rooms in Bonn).
• Subjects receive information on the real effort task. After reading the
instructions, each subject practises this task for 5 minutes.
• In the together-treatment the subjects in each group are introduced to
each other and asked to find personal similarities (e.g. hobbies) for 5
minutes. They are also informed that they are paid on a different day
and a corresponding appointment is made. Afterwards, the subjects
are separated again and do not see each other until the designated
pay-off appointment. In the separate-treatment this step is skipped
and the group mates see each other neither before nor after the task.
• Now the subjects receive the instructions for the main task as well as
some control questions and questions about social norms. The main
task consists of the same real effort task as in the beginning and sub-
jects can work between 0 and 60 minutes on the task. Their later
pay-off depends on the number of tables they and their group mates
count, depending on the treatment.
• When the subjects decide to end the task a brief questionnaire is dis-
played. Afterwards the subjects can leave immediately.
• The subjects receive their pay-off on a different appointment approxi-
mately one week after the main experiment. The reason for the sepa-
rate pay-off appointment is that the final individual pay-off depends on
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the group mate's effort which is often not known by the time a subject
ends the experiment.
The counting task for the experiment is implemented using Java and the
questionnaires are implemented in the Bonn Experiment System (BoXS)1.
The main variables which we are interested in are the time subjects spend on
the incentivised main task and how many tables they solve. The complete
set of instructions used in this experiment is provided in appendix 2.A.
2.3.2 Real Effort Task
The real effort task used in our experiment consists of counting zeroes in
large tables of binary digits. This task is intended to be both boring and
uninteresting in order to reduce any intrinsic motivation for doing the task.
Furthermore, subjects are explicitly informed in the instructions that the
task is useless and only relevant for their pay-off. The reason for this in-
formation is that feedback from several subjects participating in a pretest
indicates that they continue to work on the task despite wanting to quit in
order not to 'endanger' our experiment.
If the hourly wage were constant, subjects should, theoretically seen,
either quit immediately or work the maximum time possible, depending on
whether the wage is higher (lower) than their reservation wage. While one
might assume fatigue to be a driving force in increasing the costs over time,
pretests show that this is not the case. In fact even slight evidence for
learning effects over time can be found. As a consequence we decide to
increase the size of the tables over time. By increasing the table size the
time required per table increases and in effect, as the payment per table
remains the same, the marginal wage of working on the tables for another
minute decreases. Examples for these tables are displayed in figure 2.1.
1See chapter four.
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(a) 15x25 (minutes 0-5) (b) 25x35 (minutes 55-60)
The size of the tables increases every 5 minutes by one row and one column.
Figure 2.1: The real effort task.
By increasing the table size we enforce a convex cost function and there-
fore an inner optimum resulting in a working time between 0 and 60 minutes
for most subjects. The experiment starts with tables of size 15x25 (425 dig-
its) and every five minutes one additional row and one column are added up
to the size of 25x35 (875 digits) after 55 minutes. The payment, which is
0.06 Euro per table, and the rate at which the tables increase over time are
calculated in order to provide an average hourly wage of about 3 Euro/hour
in the beginning which decreases to about 1.5 Euro/hour in the end, depend-
ing on the individual subject's performance. Additionally a show-up fee of
about 10-12 Euros, depending on the treatment, is paid.
2.3.3 Treatments
In our experiment we use 3 different payment schemes and 2 social interaction
modes resulting in 6 separate treatments.
As payment schemes we employ a piece rate (PR), a team (T) and a
relative performance (RP) scheme. The exact pay-off formulae are shown
in table 2.1. Note that all three schemes have an equal marginal pay-off β
to solving an additional table, which simplifies the upcoming analysis and
allows us to compare the results later on. What does change, however, is
the externality generated by solving tables, which is positive in the team
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Piece rate (PR) wi = α+ β · xi
Team (T) wi = α+ β · (xi + xj)
Relative performance (RP) wi = α+ β · (xi − xj)
xi denotes subject i's individual performance,
xj is the performance of i's group mate.
Table 2.1: The payment schemes.
Payment scheme Interaction Location Subjects
Relative performance Together Frankfurt 25
Relative performance Separated Frankfurt 22
Team Together Bonn 27
Team Separated Bonn 26
Piece rate Together Bonn 18
Piece rate Separated Bonn 18
Table 2.2: Overview of the sessions.
treatment, negative in the relative performance treatment and neutral in
the piece rate treatment.
We also have two interaction treatments. In the separated treatment (s)
subjects do not meet each other neither before nor after the experiment.
In the together treatment (t) the subjects within a group get to know each
other and solve a small task together before the main task. They are then
separated, introduced to the main task and solve the real effort task alone
and without being able to communicate and without having any indication
of how long their group mate is spending on the task. They do meet again,
however, at the pay-off appointment and are then asked to briefly explain
their performance to each other. This is common knowledge and communi-
cated to the subjects before the main task.
2.3.4 Subject Pool
We started the conduction of our experiment in Frankfurt, where we could
use vacated university offices in order to separate our subjects. Unfortunately
the experiment subject pool, which was just started around that time, was
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not sufficient to provide enough subjects for all treatments. The fact that
many subjects were unfamiliar with laboratory experiments and did not show
up in time or at all was also detrimental. Therefore the remaining sessions
were done in Bonn, where empty lecture rooms during the semester break
were used. All subjects were recruited using the respective laboratories'
subject pools and the Orsee-software2.
During the sessions, which took up to 90 minutes, a maximum of 4 sub-
jects were working on the task at the same time resulting in a total of 12 to
16 observations per day.
2.4 Theoretical Predictions
In this section we derive several predictions for the subjects' behaviour for
each of the three payment schemes introduced above. For each of these
payment schemes we calculate the optimal effort level for selfish individuals,
the social optimum and the optimal effort when assuming an utility function
including social norms.
2.4.1 Selfish Optimum
If we assume that the individual is purely selfish and does not take their
group mate's utility or pay-off into account, their optimal behaviour can be
calculated easily. We assume a standard utility function which is linear in
the wage and includes a cost function:
ui = wi(xi)− ci(xi) (2.1)
The wage function depends on the payment scheme.
wi(xi) = α+ β · xi (PR) (2.2)
wi(xi) = α+ β · xi + β · xj(T) (2.3)
2See Greiner (2004)
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wi(xi) = α+ β · xi − β · xj(RP) (2.4)
Note that all three pay-off functions are chosen in a way that ensures that the
derivative of the wage, and therefore the utility, with respect to the number
of tables is the same. Using straightforward maximisation we find that the
optimal number of calculated tables for selfish individuals is the same for all
payment schemes and characterised by:
c′i(xi) = w
′
i(xi) = β (2.5)
2.4.2 Social Optimum
In the following we refer to an allocation of actions as socially optimal if it
maximises a social welfare function. While it is possible to derive a social
optimum for a variety of welfare functions, including Bergson-Samuelson-
type functions3, we use the utilitarian welfare function w = u1+u2 in which




α+ β · x1 − c1(x1) + α+ β · x2 − c2(x2) (2.6)
When the piece rate payment scheme, which does not create externalities,
is used, the social maximisation problem yields the following two conditions:
c′1(x1) = β c
′
2(x2) = β (2.7)
Hence, in the piece rate scheme the socially optimal action coincides with
the selfish action.
3Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions define social welfare as the arbitrarily weighted
sum of the individual utility functions. The main difference to the utilitarian welfare
function is that different individuals can be treated as more or less important. For more





α+ β · x1 + β · x2 − c1(x1) + α+ β · x2 + β · x1 − c2(x2) (2.8)
In the team payment scheme every additional table solved by a player creates
twice the welfare pay-off as in the piece rate treatment. Hence we find that
both individuals should work until the cost of solving another table exceeds
twice the marginal pay-off:
c′1(x1) = 2β c
′
2(x2) = 2β (2.9)
If the cost of solving a table is linear in the table size this would mean





α+ β · x1 − β · x2 − c1(x1) + α+ β · x2 − β · x1 − c2(x2) (2.10)
In the relative payment scheme every additional table solved by a player
transfers the amount β from her group mate's pay-off to her own pay-off.
The overall pay-off and therefore the utilitarian welfare does not change.
c′1(x1) = 0 c
′
2(x2) = 0 (2.11)
The socially optimal action is to work only as long as c′(x) < 0 and hence,
as we assume solving tables to be costly (c′(x) > 0), not working at all is
socially optimal.
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2.4.3 Individual Optimum with Norms
In this section we use the approach of Huck/Kübler/Weibull to determine
the optimal actions of an agent who gets a social pay-off or a social penalty
for behaving according to the social norm. The main idea is that the overall
utility of an agent is the sum of her monetary pay-off ui and a social pay-off
vi. Note that while the original model by Huck/Kübler/Weibull allows for
any number of players, the formulae used here are simplified for the two
player case relevant to our experiment.
Ui(xi, xj) = ui(xi, xj) + vi(xi, xj) (2.12)
vi(xi, xj) = G(ψi(xi, xˆj), ψj(xˆi, xj)) (2.13)
The social pay-off vi is defined as a function G which depends on the overall
externality caused by the individual i on others as well as the externality
caused onto individual i. It is reasonable to assume that the derivative of
G with respect to the externality on others is positive which means that
causing positive externalities increases an individual's utility, often referred
to as warm glow4.
ψi(xi, xj) = uj(xi, xˆb)− uj(xˆi, xˆb) (2.14)
ψi(xi, xj) denotes the externality caused by player i playing xi given that
player j plays xj . This externality is measured by calculating the difference
between player j's utility when player i plays the socially optimal action xˆi
and when she plays her actual choice xi. If a player's choice is identical to
the social norm the externality is zero by definition. If a player's choice leads
to a higher (lower) utility for the other player than the social norm, it yields
a positive (negative) externality.
4The idea of the warm glow is that the mere act of contributing to another person's
welfare increases a person's utility. See Andreoni (1990).
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Piece Rate Treatment In the case of the piece rate treatment there is
no externality.
ψ1(x1, x2) = u2(x1, xˆ2)− u2(xˆ1, xˆ2) = α+ βxˆ2 − α− βxˆ2 = 0(2.15)
ψ2(x1, x2) = u1(xˆ1, x2)− u1(xˆ1, xˆ2) = α+ βxˆ1 − α− βxˆ1 = 0(2.16)
In effect, the externality and hence the social pay-off function is constant
in each player's action. Hence a player's optimal action does not change by
adding norm awareness as compared to the selfish case.
Team Payment Treatment
ψ1(x1, x2) = α+ βxˆ2 + βx1 − α− βxˆ2 − βxˆ1 = β(x1 − xˆ1) (2.17)
ψ2(x1, x2) = α+ βxˆ1 + βx2 − α− βxˆ1 − βxˆ2 = β(x2 − xˆ2) (2.18)
In the team payment scheme the social pay-off increases in the number of
tables a player solves. If the number of tables corresponds to the number in
the social optimum, the externality is 0. If it is higher (lower) the externality
is positive (negative). Solving the above formulae for the individual utility
maximising effort choice yields:
β + β ·G′1(β(x1 − xˆ1), β(x2 − xˆ2)) = c′1(x1) (2.19)




is assumed to be strictly positive the optimal effort is
now bigger than in the selfish treatment. If we furthermore assume that
G′1 < 1, which means that the marginal externality is weighted smaller than
the marginal individual pay-off, we find that the optimal effort lies between
the selfish and the socially optimal effort.
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Relative Payment Treatment
ψ1(x1, x2) = α+ βxˆ2 − βx1 − α− βxˆ2 + βxˆ1 = β(xˆ1 − x1) (2.21)
ψ2(x1, x2) = α+ βxˆ1 − βx2 − α− βxˆ1 + βxˆ2 = β(xˆ1 − x1) (2.22)
In the relative payment scheme the social pay-off decreases in the number of
tables a player solves. If the number of tables corresponds to the number in
the social optimum the externality is 0, if it is higher (lower) the externality
is negative (positive). Solving for the individual utility maximising effort
choice yields:
β + βG′1(β(xˆ1 − x1), β(xˆ2 − x2)) = c′1(x1) (2.23)
β + βG′1(β(xˆ2 − x2), β(xˆ1 − x1)) = c′2(x2) (2.24)
Using the same assumptions as above we find that the players' optimal
effort is now lower5 than in the selfish treatment.
For the preceding analysis it was not necessary to specify the function
G besides making some very basic assumptions. Depending on the function
G, situations in which multiple equilibria exist could arise. While it is not
necessary to dwell on this any further at this point as we do not need to
calculate the exact equilibria, it is important to note that a player's optimal
action is likely to depend on their group mate's action and on how they
expect her to behave.
2.4.4 Summary
Our main hypothesis concerning the separated and together treatments is
that we expect social norms to play a bigger role if the social distance between
the group mates decreases, in other words we expect G′1 to increase when
5Note that the derivative of the inner term xˆ1 − x1 w.r.t. x1 is negative, which yields
the negative sign.
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c′(x) = ... Relative payment Piece rate Team payment
Selfish optimum β β β
Social optimum 0 β 2β
Optimum w. norms ∈ (0, β) β ∈ (β, 2β)
Table 2.3: Summary of theoretical predictions.
the subjects meet each other.
Table 2.3 summarises the theoretical results from this section. The order
of the numbers of tables we expect our subjects to count is characterised
by6:
0 ≤ xRP,t < xRP,s < xPR,t = xPR,s < xT,s < xT,t ≤ 2 · xPR,t (2.25)
2.5 Results
In this section we analyse the results from the experiment. What we are
interested in studying is the subjects' motivation to work which is proxied
both by the time until a subject leaves as well as the number of correctly
solved tables.
The number of tables solved by a subject depends on both the time spent
on the task as well as the subject's individual productivity. Unfortunately,
even though the counting task is designed to be rather simple, the individual
abilities differ substantially between the subjects. Therefore differences in
performance can be caused both by different levels of effort as well as different
ability. The time spent on the task may be a better proxy for effort. However,
the time is also likely affected by individual abilities as high ability implies
an increased hourly wage and therefore an increased optimum working time.
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(a) Time spent. (b) Tables solved.
Figure 2.2: Overall distribution.
2.5.1 Time and Performance
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show the overall distributions of the time spent on the
main task as well as the number of tables correctly solved by the subjects. We
find that the distribution of the time is censored on both ends. 25 subjects
decided to quit the task immediately and 15 subjects chose the upper bound
(60 minutes). The remaining 96 subjects worked between 0 and 60 minutes.
The distribution of the number of tables solved is censored on the left at
zero. The maximum number of tables solved in 60 minutes was 53, which
was quite impressive.
Figures 2.3a and 2.3b show the distributions separated by treatment.
We find that meeting the respective group-mate does seem to affect the time
spent on the task in the team payment and the relative payment schemes.
In the team payment scheme the average time is 6.6 minutes longer when
subjects meet each other. In the relative payment scheme the average time
is about 7.5 minutes shorter when subjects meet each other. In the piece
rate treatments the difference was less than 2 minutes.
The same is true for the number of solved tables. In the relative (team)
payment scheme, subjects solved 4.6 tables less (2.7 tables more) when meet-
ing their group-mate. It seems that social norms do have an effect in the
6Note: RP=relative payment, PR=piece rate, T=team, s=separated, t=together
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(a) Time spent. (b) Tables solved.
This figure shows beam-plots7 for the time spent on the real effort task and the number
of tables solved by treatment.
Figure 2.3: Distribution by treatment.
previously conjectured directions.
2.5.2 Regression Results
Table 2.4 shows regressions for each payment scheme and for both the time
spent on the task as well as for the number of tables solved. Note that
as the distribution of the dependent variable is censored, appropriate Tobit
regressions are used instead of the ordinary least squares regressions. So-
called Tobit regressions allow for the analysis of data which is normally
distributed but censored on one or both sides8. We do separate regressions
for each payment scheme and are interested in whether the together-dummy,
which reflects whether subjects met each other, does have a significant impact
on subject performance. We control for gender, age and ability as measured
by the individuals' performance in the pretest. We also control for the field
of study and the students' income in order to account for possible differences
in reservation wage.
In the team treatment we find that subjects spend significantly more time
on the task when meeting each other (p < 0.05 for the one-sided test). In
8Common examples include the visitors of a cinema which has a maximum seating
capacity. For more information see McDonald and Moffitt (1980).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time/Team Time/PR Time/RPS Tab./Team Tab./PR Tab./RPS
model
together 15.49* 11.34 -26.12** 4.491 3.468 -8.677**
(1.95) (1.12) (-2.55) (1.20) (0.51) (-2.16)
male -7.666 -5.430 -11.68 1.590 -3.416 -2.420
(-0.72) (-0.51) (-0.91) (0.38) (-0.42) (-0.48)
age 1.598* -0.912 1.726 0.192 -0.612 0.205
(1.77) (-0.84) (0.75) (0.95) (-0.89) (0.21)
perf. pretest -1.866 7.544** 8.405* 1.094 7.684*** 4.212**
(-0.58) (2.77) (1.96) (0.80) (3.54) (2.31)
income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
field of study Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42 26 41 42 26 41
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The first three columns of this table show the results of three regressions with the time
spent on the task as dependent variable. As the dependent variable was censored on the
left (at zero) and at the right (maximum was 60 minutes) tobit regressions were used
instead of ordinary least squares. The last three columns show the results of three tobit
regressions with the number of tables solved as dependent variable (censored on the left
at zero). Omitted from this table are the coefficients for the dummy variables used to
control for income and field of study.
Table 2.4: Regression results.
the tournament treatment subjects spend significantly less time on the task
when meeting each other (p < 0.01 for the one-sided test) and in effect solve
fewer tables (p < 0.05 for the one-sided test). For the piece rate treatments
we find no significant treatment effects.
2.5.3 Differences in the Subject Pool
One unfortunate finding of our analysis is that there is a significant difference
in ability between the students in Bonn and Frankfurt. This can be seen
clearly in figure 2.4 which displays the subjects' performance in the pretest
and shows that subjects in Frankfurt solve 0.8 tables more on average than
subjects in Bonn.
We are not certain about the origin of these differences. Maybe the
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This figure shows the performance of the subjects in the pretest, in which they were asked
to solve as many tables as possible in five minutes.
Figure 2.4: Performance differential between Bonn and Frankfurt.
different set-up of computers or the different working environment has an
effect. It is also possible that the different subject pool, i.e. very experienced
and arguably less excited experiment participants in Bonn and first-time
participants in Frankfurt has an effect. This is clearly an effect we did not
have in mind when designing our experiment.
Note however, that these differences between the two cities, while not
particularly convenient, are not problematic for our main analysis as each
payment scheme was done in the same city and the treatment effects analysed
above could not have arisen from these subject pool differences.
2.5.4 Individual Performance Differential
So, which treatment should the clever and social-norm aware manager choose?
In order to answer this question, consider figure 2.5 which improves upon
figure 2.3 by controlling for gender, age, individual ability and income9. We
find that the team-together-treatment seems to yield the highest effort and
9Note that controlling for the individual ability also compensates for the city differences
discussed above.
73
Figure 2.5: Time controlled for individual factors.
increases the time spent by 8.8 minutes compared to the overall mean. The
worst treatment seems to be the relative-together-treatment which decreases
the time spent by 8.2 minutes. Note that this ranking is in line with our
hypotheses derived above.
2.5.5 Subjective Perception of the Task
Another interesting question is how the subjects perceive the different treat-
ments and whether they enjoy working under the respective payment scheme.
Since worker motivation might suffer in the long run if the task is perceived
as unpleasant, taking worker satisfaction into account is of importance.
Figure 2.6 shows how strongly the subjects enjoy working as elicited by a
question in the questionnaire at the end. The results from this figure seem to
coincide with the previous results in that subjects seem to be most satisfied
working in the team-together task (average +1.9) and least satisfied in the
relative-together task (average -0.1).
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After the real effort task the subjects were asked as how much fun they perceive the task.
The answer can be given on a 9-point scale from -4 (no fun) to +4 (very fun).
Figure 2.6: Enjoyment of task.
2.5.6 Norm Perception
The results from the previous sections indicate that norms do have an effect
on individual effort. In order to analyse the cause of this overall effect this
section aims to analyse two driving forces.
The first force is that social interaction may lead subjects to realise that
there are social norms in the first place which they would miss otherwise.
While the instructions were formulated in an easy way and control questions
ensured that every subject understood the pay-off mechanism correctly, the
situation might still be too abstract for some people to fully understand if
they never see the person affected by their actions. In order to measure this
effect we ask the subject how long one should work on the task. The result
is shown in figure 2.7a. We find that people seem to be much more likely to
take the social norm into account when meeting each other.
The second force is, as noted in the theoretical section, that a subject's
ideal response in an environment with social norms can depend on how their
group mate behaves. Meeting their group mate may lead them to perceive
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(a) How long do you think one should work on the task?
(b) How long do you think others will work on the task?
Before the real effort task was started, the subjects were asked how long one should work
on the task (a) and how long they expect others to do so (b). The answer could be
provided in minutes from 0 to 60.
Figure 2.7: Perceived norms.
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her as more cooperative and change their behaviour in effect. In order to
estimate this effect we ask the subjects how much they estimate other people
to work on average. While this question does not exactly capture the sub-
jects' estimation for their group mate's behaviour, it may serve as a proxy.
The result is shown in figure 2.7b. We find that people do seem to estimate
other people to behave more norm conforming if they meet each other both
in the team and in the relative payment scheme10.
2.6 Manager Stage
After finding strong evidence for the role of social norms in work environ-
ments in the main experiment we are interested in the question of whether
people are aware of the social norms playing a role in this situation. In order
to find out about this we conduct a second experiment in which subjects
assume the roles of managers deciding on a work contract.
2.6.1 Design
This experiment consists of three parts. In the first part the subjects have
the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the real effort task from the
previous experiment by solving a small, a medium and a large-sized table
from the original experiment.
In the second part the subjects are instructed to assume the roles of
managers who are to choose the pay-off scheme and the social interaction for
their employees in eight different situations. In the first six situations the
social interaction is given (i.e. together or separated) and the subjects can
choose between one of two pay-off schemes. In the remaining two situations
the payment scheme is given (i.e. team or relative) and subjects can choose
the level of social interaction.
10Note that these results can not be fully explained as as self rationalisation mechanism
as the corresponding questions were asked before the main experiment was conducted.
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The subjects' choice is incentivised by randomly selecting two of the
decisions and paying the subjects according to the average work done by the
subjects working in the chosen treatments in the main experiment. Therefore
the subjects can improve their pay-off by selecting the treatments in which
the previous subjects solve the most tables in the main experiment.
Before this part of the experiment is conducted, instructions, examples
and control questions are handed out and checked by the experimenters in
order to ensure that the subjects understood the task correctly.
The third part of the experiment consists of several questions concerning
the subjects' personal situation, their interests and preferences as well as
some questions regarding empathy and social preferences. The instructions
and questionnaires are supplied in appendix 2.B.
2.6.2 Results
The experiment was performed in the BonnEconLab in three sessions and
with a total of 71 subjects recruited from the Bonn subject pool using
Orsee11. We ensured that none of the subjects already participated in the
main experiment in order to avoid influences and biases due to previous expe-
riences. The experiment was conducted using the Bonn Experiment System
(BoXS)12.
The first result is shown in figure 2.8, which displays the payment systems
chosen by the subjects given a level of social interaction.
When choosing between piece rate and team payment (first column), we
find that the majority of subjects prefers the team payment in the together
setting while preferring the piece rate payment in the separated setting. This
difference can be analysed using an appropriate McNemay-test and is highly
significant (p < 0.001).




Figure 2.8: Payment chosen by subjects.
Figure 2.9: Social interaction chosen by subjects.
find that the majority of subjects prefers the team payment in both settings.
However, this preference is much stronger in the together setting (p < 0.001).
We find no significant difference between piece rate and relative payment
as the piece rate was preferred in either case (second column).
The second result is shown in figure 2.9 which displays the social inter-
action chosen by the subjects given a payment system. We find that when
a team payment system is given 67 of 71 subjects choose the together set-
ting while 50 of 71 subjects prefer the separated setting given the relative
payment scheme. This difference is highly significant (p < 0.001).
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2.6.3 Summary
We find that many subjects do seem to be aware of the social norms playing
a role in our main experiment and chose the pay-off system or the social
interaction which is the most work-promoting given the predictions from our
theoretical model and the results from our main experiment.
2.7 Conclusion
In real companies both team based payment schemes as well as competitive
schemes are widely used. While these schemes create obvious pecuniar in-
centives to work hard, they may also cause externalities and in turn trigger
social norms which can support or counteract the intended incentives. In
this chapter we analyse the question of how the effect of social norms de-
pend on social interaction. In order to answer this question we design and
conduct a series of laboratory experiments. We exogenously change both
the payment scheme and the amount of social interaction and observe the
time the subjects spend working on an incentivised but tedious cognitive real
effort task.
We find that social norms can have both very positive and negative effects
on individual effort. The effects found are both statistically significant and
show a high relevance as the time spent on the task on average decreased or
increased by up to one third. These effects are in line with the predictions
derived from a theoretical approach. We also find that the effect of social
norms strongly depends on the amount of social interaction. In fact, in
order for the social norms to have a tangible and significant effect it seems
to be necessary for the subjects to meet before and after the work task in
question. Furthermore we can show, using an auxiliary experiment, that
most subjects are aware of the relevant social norms and are able to choose
a productivity maximising environment for their imaginary employees when
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given the chance.
While the results presented in this chapter are already significant and
show strong effects of social norms, they are likely to underestimate their
effect at 'real' work places. The incentives in our experiment are very low, the
task is played with a total stranger and no real retribution for violating norms
has to be expected. In a real work environment in which workers compete
for significant stakes, meet each other every day and strong possibilities for
enforcing social norms are in place, the effect of social norms is arguably much
stronger and should be taken into account when designing and analysing
organisation and payment schemes.
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In a work relationship an agent typically produces both successes and fail-
ures and the principal faces the question of whether and how she should
communicate the corresponding positive or negative feedback. While posi-
tive feedback in the form of praise might serve as a kind of non-monetary
reward and reinforce an agent's motivation, literature suggests that its over-
all long-term effect is ambiguous. Negative feedback in the form of criticism
and blame might hurt an agent's motivation and performance even more.
I am interested in the influence of the framing of positive and negative
feedback on an agent's motivation and effort provision. I conduct an internet
experiment in which subjects work on an incentivised, tedious and uninter-
esting real effort task. Depending on the treatment the subjects receive
different types of reinforcing feedback upon the successful or unsuccessful
completion of a task as a simple form of praise and blame. While praise
and blame in real work environments typically imply tangible consequences,
using an experiment allows me to isolate the pure motivational effect.
I find that the subjects' performance increases significantly when positive
reinforcement is provided upon success and that it decreases strongly when
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negative reinforcement is given upon failure. This result is based mainly
on a hedonic rather than a calculatory effect. Finally, I can show that the
effect of positive reinforcement is vastly different for high- and low-ability
subjects. While low-ability subjects are more likely to be encouraged by
feedback, high-ability subjects tend to be less appreciative.
Section 3.2 of this chapter provides a brief overview of the related litera-
ture. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the design of my experiment and include
a basic model for the agents' behaviour. Section 3.5 summarises the results,
which are then discussed in the concluding section 3.6.
3.2 Related Work
Psychologists explain motivation using the Cognitive Evaluation Theory,
which distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic mo-
tivation stems from the satisfaction of autonomously doing something useful
and using one's skills. Extrinsic motivation is derived from outside factors
and includes the wage and possible social pressure. Praise and blame from
a principal are specific forms of extrinsic motivation.
3.2.1 Motivational Crowding-Out
When extrinsic rewards like payment or praise are introduced, exerted effort
typically increases for as long as the rewards persist. However, when the
rewards are withdrawn, performance often drops below the level of a non-
rewarded control group. The first experiment to demonstrate this so-called
motivational crowding-out was conducted by Deci (1971)1. The common
explanation for this effect is that a person is initially uncertain about her
motivation for doing a task. Once an extrinsic reward is introduced, the
perceived locus of control for doing the task is shifted towards the external
1For more literature on motivational crowding-out see for example Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1997), Frey and Jegen (2001) and the meta-study by Deci et al. (1999).
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side, leading to a reduced fulfilment of the autonomy component required
for intrinsic motivation.
Since extrinsic rewards might diminish intrinsic motivation they should,
according to the above findings, only be offered for tasks with little existing
intrinsic value, which is in line with the so-called motivation work cycle
match as proposed by Amabile (1993).
3.2.2 Feedback and Implied Control
Benabou and Tirole (2003) analyse how these findings influence whether a
principal should provide feedback to an agent. They argue that while extrin-
sic rewards can undermine the feeling of autonomy, they can also be used
to enlarge the agent's perceived competence and hence have positive effects.
Assuming that an agent is uncertain about her motivation an interesting
optimisation problem arises for the principal, the solution of which depends
on the direct cost of the reward and its effects on the agent's behaviour and
beliefs. They find that while rewards can serve as effective short-term moti-
vators, they might also negatively influence the agent's beliefs by signalling
the principal's lack of trust in the agent's abilities and motivation.
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) conjecture that exerting control can incur a 'hid-
den cost of control' by signalling a lack of faith in the agent's trustworthiness.
They conduct a laboratory experiment in which a principal can choose to
exert control over the agent's behaviour by setting a minimum contribu-
tion amount in a simple investment game2. They find that, even though
neo-classical models would predict no difference, the agent's contribution
decreases significantly when the principal chooses to restrict her decision.
2In an investment game one subject, denoted as investor, is endowed with a certain
sum of money. She can invest a part of this money in another subject, the trustee, who
can then send back an arbitrary amount. The amount of money invested is multiplied by
a factor greater than one, which implies that cooperation can lead to an ex-post superior
level of income for both subjects.
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3.2.3 Praise and Blame
The overall effect of so-called feedback intervention, which incorporates pro-
viding an agent with information on her task performance and both praise
and blame, is controversial. As Kluger and DeNisi (1996) summarise, the
direction of the effect seems to strongly depend on whether the feedback is
perceived as a way of control by the agent.
Xiao and Houser (2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) analyse
the role of anticipated feedback on cooperation in the ultimatum game3.
Using a laboratory experiment they allow the receiving player to send a
message to the dividing player. They analyse the resulting proposals and
compare them to a control treatment in which no message could be sent.
They find that the mere anticipation of feedback is sufficient to increase
altruism and cause more equal offers.
A special type of feedback which is often used as an inexpensive way
to reward employees is the distribution of non-monetary awards and titles.
Frey and Neckermann (2006) argue that awards and titles can serve as ex-
tremely cheap and effective motivators. Given that the precise value of an
award is unknown, they might be especially useful in situations in which
only incomplete information on an agent's performance is available.
3.2.4 Graphical Social Cues
Several previous studies use smilies or related images as a proxy for human
interaction. Eckel and Wilson (2003) show smilies to experiment subjects
prior to participating in a cooperation-based game. They find that, depend-
ing on the displayed smiley, the subjects' behaviour changes. They argue
that seeing facial expressions provides valuable information about another
3The ultimatum game, first proposed by Güth et al. (1982), is a two-player game
in which one player (divider) can divide a given sum of money between herself and the
other player (receiver). The receiver can either accept the proposed offer, in which case it
becomes effective, or refuse the offer, in which case both players receive nothing.
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person's intentions and is therefore crucial in situations involving social ex-
change.
Krupka and Croson (2011) show that the hint of a human face can
strongly reinforce the effect of prevalent social norms. In a field experi-
ment they analyse how much money people are donating to support a local
library and find that simple graphical cues, in their experiment three dots




I am interested in the effect of reinforced positive and negative feedback on
effort provision. In order to analyse this effect I conduct an internet exper-
iment in which subjects participate using their home computers. Internet
experiments have the advantage of allowing subjects to participate without
the need to travel to the lab. Subjects can quit at any time and have attrac-
tive outside options as they do not need to schedule time in advance, which
is a big advantage for this type of experiment.
The subjects receive an invitation email and can participate at any time
during a period of about 5 days by clicking on a link provided in the email.
The experiment is programmed and conducted using the Bonn Experiment
System4. Upon starting the experiment the subjects are informed about their
show-up fee of 3 Euros, asked to fill out a brief questionnaire and provide in-
formation on their preferred payment. In order to keep the transaction costs
for participating in the experiment as low as possible, I offer to either send
the money by mail or by bank transfer5. The subjects are informed about
the payment options in the invitation email and asked to only participate if
4See chapter four.
5About 2/3 of the subjects preferred the bank transfer.
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(a) Table with 100 characters. (b) Table with 300 characters.
This figure shows two example tables of the real effort task. The first table in the experi-
ment contains only 5 characters while the last table contains 299. The number of characters
increases by 2 after each table regardless of whether the previous table is solved correctly
or incorrectly. After the table containing 299 characters is solved the experiment ends.
Figure 3.1: The real effort task.
they agree with them.
3.3.2 Experiment Design
The real effort task of the experiment consists of counting the number of
vowels in tables of randomly generated letters. For each correctly solved table
subjects receive 0.10 Euros while 0.02 Euro are deduced for every incorrectly
solved table. The subjects are allowed to quit the experiment after each
table by selecting the corresponding option, in which case they receive the
money earned so far without negative consequences.
The number of letters in each table increases over time, which increases
both the time required to solve a table as well as the probability to make a
counting error. The consequence of this is that it is relatively attractive to
solve the easy tables in the beginning while the task becomes less attractive
over time. Two tables of different sizes are shown in figure 3.1 and the full
set of instructions is provided in appendix 3.A.
The counting task is deliberately chosen to be tedious and uninteresting
and subjects are informed that solving the tables only affects their pay-off
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(a) Positive (b) Negative (c) None
Figure 3.2: Examples for reinforcement types.
and is of no further use. The reason for this statement is that previous
experiments indicate that subjects often feel pressured to work on the task
in order not to 'risk the results of the experiment'.
The main variable I observe is the number of tables solved by the subjects
as a proxy for effort and productivity. Additionally, after every fifth table a
brief questionnaire asks the subjects whether they perceive the task as fun
or tedious on a 7-point Likert scale and how many of the following five tables
they estimate to solve correctly.
3.3.3 Treatment Groups
The treatment variation in the experiment is the way the subjects receive
feedback after solving each table. In all treatments information about the
total pay-off so far is given, which implicitly includes the information whether
the previous table was counted correctly or incorrectly6.
Additionally, in three of the four treatments a random positive image is
shown on success and/or a negative image is shown on failure, which I refer to
as positive or negative reinforcement. The image shown upon counting suc-
cessfully can be a happy smiley, a thumbs-up, a star or the text 'RICHTIG'
(correct). Upon counting incorrectly a sad smiley, a thumbs-down, a light-
6If the total pay-off increases by 0.10 Euro (decreases by 0.02 Euro) as compared to
the last pay-off, the input was correct (incorrect).
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Name Subjects Display on success Display on failure
 20 Total pay-off Total pay-off
P- 25 Total pay-off & Pos. reinf. Total pay-off
-N 24 Total pay-off Total pay-off & Neg. reinf.
PN 25 Total pay-off & Pos. reinf. Total pay-off & Neg. reinf.
Table 3.1: Treatment groups.
ning bolt or the text 'FALSCH' (incorrect) is displayed. An example is shown
in figure 3.2 and all possible images are provided in appendix 3.B7.
3.4 Model and Hypotheses
Neo-Classical Perspective
Using the standard microeconomic model as a foundation one can formulate
an agent's utility function as u(n) = w(nC , nI) − c(n, a, t), where nC and
nI denote the numbers of correctly and incorrectly solved tables. w(nC , nI)
denotes the corresponding wage. The expected marginal wage of working on
another table depends on the probability p(n) of solving it correctly, which
decreases as the tables become more difficult ( ∂p∂n < 0).
The function c(n, a, t) represents the cost of solving the tables expressed
as a pecuniar value which depends on the number of the table n, the indi-
vidual ability a and the perceived tediousness of the task t. I assume that
a subject always tries to solve a table correctly and that solving a table
incorrectly is as costly as solving it correctly. I furthermore assume that
the ability level a is exogenous and that higher levels of ability decrease the
marginal cost of working on the task ( ∂
2c
∂n ∂a < 0). An increase in the level
of perceived tediousness t should increase the costs ( ∂
2c
∂n ∂t > 0). Since the
difficulty of the tables increases as they get bigger, c(n, a, t) is a strictly




7When only the total pay-off is to be displayed an empty white image is loaded alongside
in order to eliminate possible effects from image-treatments taking longer to load and
display.
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As the second derivatives to all terms of the utility function are nega-
tive, one can conclude that the optimal effort for each subject is an inner
maximum as characterised by equation 3.1:
u′(n∗, a, t) = p(n∗) · 0.1− (1− p(n∗)) · 0.02− c′(n∗, a, t) = 0 (3.1)
Behavioural Perspective
From a neo-classical perspective differences in the framing of the feedback
should have no effect on the optimal effort provision as the above optimality
condition is not affected. However, from a behavioural perspective two effects
might occur:
• Subjects may have an unclear perception of their ability a and the prob-
ability p(n) of solving upcoming tables correctly. Positive (negative)
reinforcement might make the subjects more aware of their successes
(failures) and bias their perception of p(n) and a upwards (downwards).
I refer to this as the computational effect.
• Subjects may also be unclear about how much fun and how tedious
the task is and giving them positive (negative) reinforcement might
decrease (increase) the perceived tediousness t. I refer to this as the
hedonic effect.
In order to be able to disentangle the computational and hedonic effects
three questions are asked during the experiment. A question asking how
many of the upcoming tables the subject expects to solve correctly is intended
to capture the computational effect. Two questions of how fun and how




Both the computational and the hedonic effect would imply a higher effort
provision when positive reinforcement is provided and a lower effort provision
when negative reinforcement is given. No clear prediction can be made for
treatments including both positive and negative reinforcement. In summary,














This section summarises the results from my experiment. Subsection 3.5.1
describes the data gathered in the experiment, which is then used to estimate
the hypothesised framing effects in 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. In 3.5.4 the data is
used to estimate the subjects' cost and wage functions and thus provide
another perspective on the treatment effect. In subsection 3.5.5 the data from
the questionnaire is used to analyse whether the treatment differences are
primarily driven by a computational or a hedonic effect. Finally, subsection
3.5.6 presents additional insights derived from examining high- and low-
ability subjects separately.
3.5.1 Data
I invited about 300 subjects who were registered at the BonnEconLab using
ORSEE8. Out of these subjects, a total of 94 subjects participated and were
distributed randomly across the 4 treatments (see table 3.1). 8 more subjects
participated but experienced technical difficulties during the experiment9
and were excluded from the upcoming analysis.
8See Greiner (2004).
9For example computer crashes, problems with the internet browser, problems with
the internet connection etc.
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Figure 3.3: Time spent on the main task and pay-off (polynomial fit).
The subjects spent an average of about 35 minutes on the task and earned
an average of 8.35 Euros in total. Figure 3.3 shows the relation between the
time spent on the experiment and the pay-off, which is concave due to the
increasing difficulty of the tables over time. While the first 5 Euros10 could
usually be earned in less than 10 minutes, earning 10 Euros took about 50
minutes on average. Earning 15 Euros was possible but took about 2 hours,
which was apparently not very attractive for most subjects.
3.5.2 Influence of Positive and Negative Reinforcement
I am primarily interested in the number of tables solved as a proxy for
effort and productivity. The number of solved tables is count data and does
therefore not follow the normal distribution, which discourages the use of
the usual ordinary least squares regression. Instead, Poisson regressions,
which assume Poisson distributed dependent variables, can and should be
used. Modern statistics packages like Stata can estimate Poisson regression
models efficiently using the maximum-likelihood estimation method. Table
3.2 shows the results of 5 different Poisson regressions on the number of
tables solved including different sets of explanatory variables.
10including the show-up fee
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tables solved Tables solved Tables solved Tables solved Tables solved
Tables solved
Positive reinforcement -0.0327 0.00464 -0.0267 0.0418 0.0613**
(-1.26) (0.17) (-1.01) (1.45) (2.08)
Negative reinforcement -0.112*** -0.105*** -0.170*** -0.199*** -0.257***
(-4.33) (-4.04) (-6.34) (-7.21) (-9.00)
Male -0.142*** -0.120*** -0.190***
(-5.21) (-4.00) (-5.66)
Age -0.0129*** -0.0158*** -0.0126***
(-3.00) (-3.27) (-2.59)
Participated in sim. exp. 0.0251 -0.0207 -0.0507*
(0.90) (-0.70) (-1.69)
First 23 tables correct 2.213*** 2.487*** 2.700***
(10.17) (10.89) (11.59)
First 23 tables avg. time 0.00201* 0.00189 0.00365***
(1.65) (1.44) (2.64)
Constant 4.229*** 4.572*** 2.197*** 2.004*** 2.047***
(183.59) (43.61) (10.75) (8.69) (8.81)
Time No No No Yes Yes
Field of Study No No No No Yes
Observations 94 94 85 85 85
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This table shows the results of 5 Poisson regressions with the number of solved tables
(both correctly and incorrectly counted tables) as dependent variable. The subjects'
performance in the first 23 tables is used as a proxy for individual ability (columns 3-
5). Further control variables include dummy variables for the time of the day when the
experiment was started by the subject in four-hour-sections (columns 4-5) as well as 7
dummy variables for the category of study (column 5).
Table 3.2: Regression results for number of tables.
The first column shows a simple regression using only the dummy vari-
ables of whether positive and/or negative reinforcement was provided. Columns
two and three add controls for gender, age and previous participation in
counting experiments as well as proxies for the subjects' ability11.
I find that negative reinforcement has a significant effect and seems to
decrease performance by about 10 to 15%12. Positive reinforcement does not
11I use the percentage of correct tables and the time spent on the first 23 tables as
proxies for individual ability. The first 23 tables include the tables containing 5 to 50
characters.
12The coefficient estimates of the Poisson regressions can be interpreted as the differences
in logs of the dependent variable. This allows us to calculate the approximate treatment
differences based on the coefficients:
logn∗N = log n∗− − 0.105⇔ n∗N = n∗−/ exp(0.105) ≈ 0.90 · n∗−
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(a) Time of participation (b) Field of study
Figure 3.4: Performance by time of participation and field of study.
seem to have a significant effect.
3.5.3 Influence of Field of Study and Time of Participation
As the experiment was an internet experiment, subjects could execute it
at any day- or night time. Figure 3.4a shows that performance was lowest
between 4 am and 8 am, which could be related to the subjects being in a
hurry at that time or sample selection effects, with for example the more busy
students participating in the morning. In the regression shown in column 4 I
control for the time of participation and find that the coefficient for negative
reinforcement becomes both stronger and more significant.
Finally, I also control for the field in which the participant is studying and
find that the coefficient for positive reinforcement becomes significant. The
resulting fifth regression implies that, ceteris paribus, positive reinforcement
increases performance by about 6%13 while negative reinforcement decreases
performance by 23%14.
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(a) Original data (b) Residuals
Figure (a) shows a beam-plot of the number of tables solved by treatment. Using the find-
ings from the previous regressions (see table 3.2) I can control for gender, age, individual
ability, time of participation and field of study. Figure (b) shows the residuals remaining
from a corresponding regression on the number of tables.
Figure 3.5: Performance by treatment.
Graphical Representation of Treatment Differences
The beam plot provided in figure 3.5a shows the number of tables solved by
treatment. I find that while the treatments including negative reinforcement
(-N and PN) seem to yield somewhat less performance, the effect does not
seem to be very strong. Using the Poisson regression analysis to control for
the factors explained above, I can filter the results which yields figure 3.5b
and shows clear differences in the performance levels between the different
treatments.
3.5.4 Estimating Pay-Off and Cost Functions
Using the data collected in our experiment I can estimate both the expected
pay-off as well as the cost functions, which allows the analysis of the agents'
effort provision problem from a different perspective.
logn∗N = log n∗− − 0.170⇔ n∗N = n∗−/ exp(0.170) ≈ 0.84 · n∗−
13lognP∗ = log n−∗ + 0.061⇔ nP∗ = n−∗ ∗ exp(0.061) ≈ 1.06 · n−∗
14logn∗N = log n∗− − 0.257⇔ n∗N = n∗−/ exp(0.257) ≈ 0.77 · n∗−
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Estimating the Pay-Off Function
While the piece rate remains constant during the experiment, the probability
of solving a table correctly decreases as the tables get bigger. Assuming that
counting each character yields a small error probability f , one can write the
probability of solving a table correctly as p(n) = (1 − f)n15. This equation
and its parameter f can be estimated as a non-linear model based on the
data gathered in the experiment. For the estimation I use the average error
rate of the first 23 tables. The resulting pay-off function is given by:
Eˆ[u′i(n)] = 0.1 · (1− fˆi)n − 0.02 · (1− (1− fˆi)n) (3.3)
Estimating the Cost Function
The table q at which a subject quits the experiment indicates the point in
time when the expected marginal pay-off from participating in the experi-
ment is surpassed by the subject's marginal cost for participation:
cˆ′(q, a, t) = Eˆ[u′i(q)] (3.4)
Using this equation and the assumption that the cost for working on the
task is proportional to the required time, one can formulate the marginal
cost of solving a table as a function of the required time d(n, a):
cˆ′(n, a, t) =
d(n, a)
d(q, a)
· cˆ′(q, a, t) (3.5)
This marginal cost can be interpreted as the combination of the subject's
marginal outside option and the exhaustion resulting from working on the
task. Given that the subjects' outside options should be unrelated to the
treatment, all treatment differences should indicate changes in the latter
component.
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Figure 3.6: Estimated pay-off and cost functions.
Summary
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated ex-ante utility- and cost-functions for an
average subject within each treatment. The size of the table at which the
average subject quits is located at the intersections of the marginal expected
pay-off and the marginal cost. The main difference in the four graphs is the
slope of the marginal cost functions. While the slope in the positive-framing
treatment is relatively flat, resulting in higher performance, the slope in the
negative framing treatment is almost twice as steep. Negative reinforcement
seems to make the task more exhausting for the subjects which explains the
lower performance.




Fun Tedious Est. prob.
Count time -0.000000126 -0.00000402** 0.000000811
(-0.07) (-2.11) (0.83)
Size of table -0.0187*** -0.0185*** -0.00601***
(-14.89) (-13.60) (-9.25)
Size of table x Positive feedback 0.00233* 0.00360** 0.000390
(1.70) (2.51) (0.57)
Size of table x Negative feedback -0.00180 -0.00468*** 0.000216
(-1.31) (-3.24) (0.32)
Constant 1.393*** 1.848*** 4.713***
(19.40) (24.99) (138.27)
Observations 954 987 1139
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
After every fifth table subjects are asked how much fun/how tedious the task is, as well
as how many of the upcoming five tables they expect to solve correctly. This table shows
the results of fixed-effects panel regressions for each of the three variables. Explanatory
variables are the time required to count the current table, the size of the current table as
well as the interaction terms between table size and positive/negative framing.
Table 3.3: Influence on fun, tediousness and estimated probability.
3.5.5 Analysing the Influence of Feedback
On a more detailed level, I approach the question of how the effect of re-
inforcement works by examining the answers to the questionnaires, which
were conducted after every fifth table. I use a fixed-effects panel regression
in which I model the effect of positive and negative reinforcement as an effect
over time. The idea is that while, for example, the fun of solving the tables
always diminishes as the tables get bigger, this diminishment might occur at
a faster or slower rate when negative or positive reinforcement is provided.
The results of these regressions are displayed in table 3.3.
I find that negative reinforcement decreases the perceived fun and sig-
nificantly increases perceived tediousness. Positive reinforcement has the
reverse effect and is significant for both measures. The scale of these effects
is about one point on a seven-point Likert scale for fun and tediousness for
every 100 tables.
Unlike fun and tediousness, the estimated probability of solving the up-
coming tables correctly does not seem to be affected significantly by either
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type of framing. Based on these results one can conclude that the framing
effect measured in the previous sections is primarily a hedonic rather than a
computational effect.
3.5.6 Effect for Low- and High-Ability Agents
The previous sections analyse the framing effect jointly for all subjects re-
gardless of their ability. In this section I partition the subjects according to
their ability and analyse the treatment effect for each group. In order to do
this I use the subjects' performance in the first 23 tables to estimate their
ability. I classify a subject as low (high) ability type if the time required for
the first tables is above (below) the median time.
Table 3.4 shows the results of two separate regressions for each ability
type. Surprisingly, I find that the effect of positive reinforcement seems
to differ strongly for the two types. While the provision of positive rein-
forcement seems to benefit the performance of low ability types it seems
to strongly hurt the performance of high types. Both effects are strongly
significant (p < 0.001 for both coefficients) in opposing directions. The ef-
fect for negative reinforcement is unambiguously negative for both types and
likewise significant (p < 0.001).
This finding implies that high ability types should perform worst when
both types of reinforcement are provided. The combined coefficient for
positive and negative reinforcement is −0.552, which implies a decrease in
performance by more than 40%16 for this treatment compared to the no-
reinforcement-treatment, which is a surprisingly huge effect. In fact, the
negative effect of the reinforcement treatments is so strong that high ability
subjects end up solving fewer tables on average than low ability subjects.
Figure 3.7 shows beam-plots for both subject types. As the previous
regression indicates, a clear trend can be seen for high ability types: The









Participated in sim. exp. 0.0436 -0.133***
(0.87) (-2.87)
First 23 tables correct 2.753*** 1.707***
(8.31) (3.81)
First 23 tables avg. time 0.00378 0.000236
(0.27) (0.13)
Positive reinforcement -0.222*** 0.297***
(-3.96) (6.97)





Field of Study Yes Yes
Observations 42 43
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This table shows the regression results for the number of solved tables estimated separately
for high- and low-ability subjects. A subject was classified as low (high) ability type if she
required more (less) than the median average time for the first 23 tables.
Table 3.4: Number of tables solved by treatment and ability.
more reinforcing feedback is provided, the worse the subject's performance
becomes. Performance is highest in the treatment in which no feedback is
provided and lowest when both types of reinforcement are given.
For low ability types the effect of positive reinforcement seems to be
motivating and performance enhancing. It even seems to slightly outweigh
the effect of negative reinforcement. The performance for low ability types
seems to be highest when only positive feedback is provided.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
I confront experiment subjects with an incentivised real effort task, which
can be ended at any time, and exogenously vary the type of reinforcement
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Figure 3.7: Number of tables solved by treatment and ability.
the subjects receive after each table. While every subject receives the infor-
mation of whether a table is solved correctly or not, some subjects receive
additional positive and/or negative images as reinforcement.
I find that the reinforcing images have a significant and strong effect on
the perceived tediousness of the task. As a result, administering negative
reinforcement decreases the subjects' average performance by up to 20%
while giving positive reinforcement increases it by about 5%. Furthermore I
find that the treatment effects differ substantially for high- and low-ability
subject types. Subjects with low ability seem to appreciate positive feedback
and become encouraged by it. Subjects with high ability seem to disregard
any kind of feedback and sharply reduce their effort when confronted with
it.
While these effects are already surprisingly strong given that the treat-
ment variation is relatively small, it can be argued that the treatment effect
estimated in this chapter is likely to underestimate the effect of real world
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reinforcement, where feedback is given by a real and well-known person as
opposed to a computer program and often bears tangible consequences.
The implications for real work environments are straightforward. While
there are obviously cases when negative feedback has to be given in order
to avoid future mistakes, the results suggest that explicit negative feedback
upon failure should be kept to a minimum and blame should be avoided.
At the same time, while positive feedback might be a useful and likewise
inexpensive way to increase performance, the results suggest that even praise
can be demotivating for some agent types.
Given the data at hand it remains unclear why different subject types
react to the reinforcing feedback in a seemingly contradictory way. An in-
teresting aspect for further research seems to be the analysis of the subjects'
personality types, for example using the Five Factor Model. Additional ques-
tionnaires regarding the subjects' motivation might also yield more insight
into the question for which types of people and in which situations reinforcing
feedback can be advantageous.
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3.A Screenshots of the Experiment














3.B Positive and Negative Reinforcement
Note: The smilies and the text were created using OpenOffice and gimp, the









Behavioural experiments have become a vital part of economic research in
the preceding decade as they allow researchers to study actual human be-
haviour beyond the predictions of theoretical models. Most major economics
departments now run dedicated laboratories which centralise the recruitment
of experiment subjects and simplify the experiment conduction.
Nowadays most experiments are conducted using computers instead of
pen-and-pencil methods, which brings both theoretical and practical ad-
vantages for experimenters: 1) Computers allow for experiments involving
complex real-time interaction between subjects, e.g. in market or auction
related experiments, which would be extremely tedious to conduct other-
wise. 2) Using computers to interact with the subjects reduces possible
experimenter effects and makes reproducing an experiment easier. 3) An ex-
periment which was programmed once can be easily documented and shared
amongst researchers. 4) The data generated by an experiment can be auto-
matically collected and exported to spreadsheet and statistics programs.
In the course of the last decade, computer technology has vastly im-
proved, affecting both the abilities of modern computers as well as their
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possible applications. Fast and stable internet connections are widely spread
among both institutional and private users and computers have become able
to display high quality audio and video files. At the same time the accep-
tance of computers has increased with most users as has their sophistication
in using them.
4.1.1 Related Work
In the very beginning of computerised experiments no experiment software
existed which would help experimenters design and run their experiments.
This required every experimenter to implement her experiment from scratch
using complex programming languages like C++, which in turn required
the experimenter to either acquire significant programming skills or delegate
the implementation to a professional programmer. While many experiment
designs are easy to explain, they may be very hard to implement. Especially
the programming of network communication and the graphical user interface
can be very complicated and tedious and often outweighs the advantages of
using computers in the first place.
The first major improvement on this situation came in the form of RatIm-
age, developed by Abbink and Sadrieh (1995), which is a library of common
functions required for most experiments, for example user interface design.
While RatImage still required the experimenter to program his experiment in
low-level programming languages, many tasks could be vastly simplified by
using its predefined routines. Unfortunately, RatImage, which was designed
for the outdated MS-DOS operating system, seems to be neither supported
nor available any more.
The next major improvement was z-Tree, which was introduced by Fis-
chbacher (1999)1 and has been steadily supported and improved ever since.
Based on the citation count it is probably the most relevant experiment
1See also Fischbacher (2007).
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software to date, especially for economists. The main feature of z-Tree is
that it allows the experimenter to design many experiments without writing
any program code. It provides an extensive graphical user interface which
makes all the important functions accessible and allows the user to design
experiments by arranging basic components like text fields and buttons on
a tree-like structure. By providing this simplified approach z-Tree allows
experimenters with no prior programming experience to implement and run
an experiment, while at the same time providing a feature set extensive
enough to allow for the implementation of most experiment types. Z-Tree
is designed for the Microsoft Windows operating system and provides both
server (zTree) and a client (zLeaf) applications which communicate using the
TCP-IP protocol. The most recent version of z-Tree implements graphics,
both for presentation and interaction, the support for external hardware and
chat functionality.
Regate, designed by Zeiliger (2009), is another experiment software sys-
tem for Windows which enables experimenters to program and conduct com-
puterised experiments2. It provides an elaborate and complex user interface
which experimenters can use to program and supervise their experiments.
Programs consist of several script statements which are inserted in a tree
structure. Debugging and testing are simplified in Regate by a) enabling the
experimenter to play several subjects on the same computer and screen at the
same time and b) providing the possibility to simulate subjects' behaviour
by having the software make random choices in a specified range. Regate
includes an online documentation and provides several sample programs.
Finally, Kirchkamp (2004) provides a good overview on how internet
experiments can be implemented. He explains both how to use existing
experiment software like z-Tree and RatImage in an internet environment as
2Since no published paper on Regate is available yet, this paragraph is
based on the presentation and the manual available at the official homepage:
http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/∼zeiliger/regate/regate.htm
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well as the more basic programming approach based on HTML and PHP.
All the mentioned platforms have weaknesses. First, they are designed
for laboratory experiments only and are often not designed for mobile or
internet experiments. They also heavily rely on Windows as their only sup-
ported platform and cannot be used on devices like mobile phones. Second,
they are often not very user friendly, not very easy to learn and often lack
a comprehensive and up-to-date documentation. Finally, many of the men-
tioned platforms are no longer supported and often cannot be used on recent
computers.
4.1.2 Introducing the Bonn Experiment System
This chapter introduces the Bonn Experiment System (BoXS), which pro-
vides a platform for experimenters which is both flexible and easy to use.
The flexibility of the Bonn Experiment System arises from two facts.
First, the system is based on the Java platform, which allows it to be used
on a wide variety of platforms, including both different device types like
netbooks and mobile devices as well as different operating systems like Win-
dows, Linux and MacOS. Second, while it is still possible to download and
use the BoXS in an oine environment, it can use the internet as a medium
to connect the computers participating in an experiment, which enables any
computer worldwide to participate in an experiment without requiring the
experimenters to set up their own network structure. This allows for a variety
of experiment environments:
• Laboratory experiments, both using an official server (which is easier
to use) or an oine server (which allows for experiments without an
internet connection).
• Internet experiments in which subjects participate using their private
computers at home.
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(a) Program code. (b) Resulting screen.
Figure 4.1: A simple questionnaire in the Bonn Experiment System.
• International experiments where subjects from different countries par-
ticipate using computers connected over the internet.
• Mobile experiments using netbooks, laptops or Java-compatible mobile
phones connected over wireless internet.
• Cross-platform experiments involving Windows, Linux and MacOS.
The Bonn Experiment System also introduces useful features like the
simple measurement of response times and the tracking of a input history
for each variable, which may be interesting for researchers interested in choice
revision behaviour or the individual decision process.
Besides being flexible, the BoXS is also very robust. When a subject's
computer or even the experimenter's computer crashes, the experiment con-
tinues and the affected subjects/experimenter can simply reconnect and re-
sume the experiment at the point before the crash while all previous data is
preserved.
The BoXS is easy to use for several reasons. The programming language
implemented in the BoXS is designed to be compact, easy to learn and in-
tuitive to use and resembles popular programming languages like Java. The
BoXS also features extensive documentation including an online manual, ex-
ample programs, a tutorial, a site answering frequent questions, a discussion
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group where questions can be posted and, coming soon, video tutorials for
the most common questions. The user feedback from experimenters writing
their first experiments using the BoXS has so far been very positive. Fur-
thermore, the BoXS does not require any installation on a computer. This
makes setting up even complex experiment environments easy as inviting
someone to participate in an experiment only requires sending a link. Test-
ing and debugging is also easy as the BoXS allows the easy simulation of a
large number of subjects.
4.1.3 Outline
Section 4.2 of this chapter is intended for experimenters who have not used
the BoXS before and want to learn about its features. It starts with a
brief tutorial and provides information on how to use the BoXS in different
environments.
Section 4.3 describes the BoXS Programming Language (BoXSPL), which
is introduced by the BoXS and is intended to provide a simple way for non-
programmers to design experiments. The section describes how programs
are executed and how the most important commands work.
Section 4.4 provides a more in-depth technical description of the under-
lying network architecture and communication, as well as on how the server
and client software is realised. It is primarily intended for readers with a
computer science background who are interested in how the Bonn Experi-
ment System works.
The last two sections discuss the current state and the possible future
development of the BoXS. Finally, a full documentation of the BoXSPL as
well as several example programs are provided in the appendix.
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4.2 Using the BoXS
This section provides practical tips for experimenters considering to use the
Bonn Experiment System (BoXS). It begins by providing a brief tutorial
which demonstrates how to write a simple experiment, proceeds with a de-
scription of the user interface and explains how to use the BoXS in laboratory
and internet experiments.
4.2.1 Quick Start Tutorial
This tutorial explains how to write the quintessential "Hello World"-program
in less than 5 minutes. For this tutorial to work an internet connection, an
internet browser and the Java plug-in for the browser are required.
1. Launch a web browser and open the site boxs.uni-bonn.de.
2. Click on "Start Experiment!".
3. Click on "1 Experimenter, 2 Subjects".
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4. When asked for a password, just click on "Ok".
5. The top half of the screen contains the experimenter view. The bottom
part contains two subject views for testing purposes. Click on the large
white area in the top and enter the following program:
display("Hello World")
wait()
6. When done, click on the green start-icon on the right.
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The Hello World program is successfully compiled by the server and
executed on the two simulated subject clients in the bottom. When you
click on "Continue" in the subject views the experiment ends and you can
write and start a new experiment. Feel free to experiment by editing and
expanding the example program.
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Figure 4.2: The starting page.
4.2.2 Starting an Experiment
Figure 4.2 shows the BoXS web site which is typically used to the start an
experiment. At the beginning, the experimenter has to specify a realm id
and, if required, her email address. In the BoXS, each experiment is uniquely
identified by its realm id which ensures that your subjects do not get mixed
up with other experiments. By default the realm id is a generated random
number which is sufficient for most cases. Alternatively, it can be set to
the experimenter's name, institution or her experiment's name. Specifying
an email address enables the BoXS to automatically send results to the
experimenter's email account. Note that this is completely optional as data
can be exported without using this mail option.
Upon clicking on 'Start Experiment!', the 'Available Setups'-page shown
in figure 4.3 is displayed. This page offers a large number of possible display
set-ups for the experiment, which each include an experimenter view and/or
one or more subject views. The quick start tutorial uses one experimenter
view and two subject views on the same page, which is useful for testing pur-
poses. Other available set-ups include pure experimenter or subject views,
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Figure 4.3: The 'Available Setups' page.
which are useful for actual experiments, as well as pages with up to 16
subjects each, which are intended for testing and debugging. If more than
16 subject views are required, the respective page can be opened multiple
times. Every set-up opened from this page is automatically associated with
the created experiment and shows up on the corresponding experimenter's
screen.
Note that while an arbitrary number of subjects can be active at the
same time, only one experimenter can. When another experimenter client
is started, all previously connected experimenter clients for the respective
realm are disconnected automatically.
4.2.3 The Experimenter View
Figure 4.4 shows the main experimenter view which allows her to write pro-
grams as well as start, supervise and cancel experiments.
When the experimenter view is first displayed, the experimenter is asked
for a password. By default each new realm is created without a password. In
order to specify a password it can be entered at this point and experimenters
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Figure 4.4: The experimenter view.
are required to enter it whenever they reconnect to this realm in the future.
Setting a password is strongly recommended as ill-meaning and well-informed
subjects could specify it otherwise and prevent the legitimate experimenter
from accessing her experiment.
The main component of the experimenter view is the program editor
in the left part into which experimenters can enter their programs. The
program editor allows copy and paste as well as undo and redo. It also
provides automatic syntax highlighting, which enhances the readability of
the program code. The buttons on top of the program editor allow the
experimenter to load and save programs and to change the font size of the
editor.
On the bottom right of the client view a list of all the subjects who are
connected to the experiment is displayed. This list is updated whenever new
subjects join the experiment or the status of a subject changes. Subjects
who are available for an experiment are displayed in green, subjects in an
experiment are displayed as blue and subjects who were disconnected during
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an experiment and suspended are shown in red. On top of the subject list
buttons to start a normal experiment, to start a delayed experiment and to
cancel an experiment are provided.
The variable list in the top right area displays all data generated by
the currently running experiment in a table with each subject in a separate
column. The data displayed in this table can be exported to a comma-
separated values file (CSV) by clicking on the export button on top of it.
The separation between the program editor and the variable view can be
dragged by the experimenter to suit her layout preferences.
4.2.4 Internet Experiments
In the tutorial both the experimenter and the subject clients are executed
on the same computer. Conducting a real experiment with other people is
relatively straightforward. In order to conduct an internet experiment, one
can copy the subject link displayed on the 'Available Setups'-page and send
it to the desired subjects. For example:
http://boxs.uni-bonn.de/expsys/es_subject.html?host=boxs.uni-
bonn.de&port=58000&realm=1963527&email=&username=new
The link contains the realm id and the server data required for participating
in the experiment. If another person opens this link in her web browser,
she shows up in the subject list with the user name specified in the link.
The experiment can then be started by pressing the start-button in the
experimenter's view as described in the tutorial. Information on starting the
experiment automatically is provided in section 4.2.7.
4.2.5 Laboratory Experiments
Laboratory experiments using the BoXS work very similar to internet exper-
iments. In the beginning the subject link copied from the 'Available Setups'-
page has to be opened on each computer in the laboratory. The user name
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(a) Laboratory experiments (b) International experiments
(c) Home experiments (d) Mobile experiments
Figure 4.5: Possible applications for the Bonn Experiment System.
should be changed to reflect each computers' cubicle/room number in order
to correctly identify the subjects and their computers later on. As copying
this link can be quite tedious, it is generally a good idea to bookmark the
link on every computer so that it can be reused for future experiments.
Like in the internet experiment example the subjects show up in the
experimenter's available subjects list and the experiment can be started by
clicking on the start-button.
4.2.6 Using an Oine Server
Usually the official BoXS server is recommended for all experiments as it is
the most convenient way. There are some cases, however, in which the set-up
and use of a local BoXS server can be advantageous. Experiments for which
no internet connection is available, for instance due to technical restrictions
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or restrictive laboratory policies, are a good example. Another kind of sit-
uation are high-frequency experiments where extremely fast reaction times
and very low latencies are required.
The package required for running a local BoXS server can be downloaded
from the general information section of the homepage which also includes
some tips on how to set it up. In a nutshell, the experimenter needs to exe-
cute the downloaded BoXS server on one of the computers. Then the official
server's name (boxs.uni-bonn.de) on the participation links has to be sub-
stituted by the IP address of the computer running the server. Afterwards,
everything should work like when using the official internet server with the
exception of the email functionality.
4.2.7 Autorun Experiments
Some experiments, especially internet experiments, require to be run while
the experimenter is not available. Consider the case in which the experi-
menter wants participants to fill out an online questionnaire during a certain
time period. Doing this with the methods discussed previously would re-
quire the experimenter to sit in front of her computer and manually start an
experiment whenever a participant connects to the BoXS.
In order to simplify this process so-called autorun experiments have been
implemented. An autorun experiment is created by writing a program as
usual and clicking the blue 'autorun'-button when done. The experiment is
now stored on the server and the experimenter can turn off her computer
without affecting it.
Whenever a subject with the appropriate realm id logs onto the server,
the stored experiment is automatically executed. The data of the experiment,
including all previous observations, is sent to the experimenter by email
after each completed observation. Note that a valid email address has to be
specified at the beginning of the experiment in this case.
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4.2.8 Troubleshooting
The following two problems are encountered frequently when using the BoXS
and can be solved easily:
• If nothing is displayed after clicking on a link on the 'Available Subjects'-
page, the Java plug-in is probably not properly installed. The Java
plug-in is available for free and most web browsers notify the user in
case it is missing and aid her in its installation. Otherwise it can be
installed manually by visiting the Java homepage at www.java.com
and downloading and installing the Java Standard Edition Runtime
Environment (JRE).
• If a message claiming that clients cannot connect to the server is dis-
played despite a working internet connection, the experimenter's insti-
tute's firewall is probably at fault. In order to resolve this, the corre-
sponding IT department should be kindly requested to open the ports
58000 and 58001, which are used by the BoXS, for TCP connections.
4.2.9 Documentation
Several ways are available to learn more about how to use the Bonn Exper-
iment System:
• The appendix of this chapter as well as the largely equivalent online
documentation provide an elaborate documentation for each command
available in the BoXSPL:
http://boxs.uni-bonn.de/documentation/index.html
• The documented example programs, which are printed in the appendix
of this chapter and can be downloaded on the web site provide examples




• The frequently asked questions section on the web site contains a big
list of answered questions and is a good place to start when problems
and questions are encountered:
http://boxs.uni-bonn.de/general/index.html
• A public mailing list exists where all users can ask questions and are
invited to contribute to the general discussion:
http://groups.google.com/group/bonn-experiment-system
• Video tutorials demonstrating the basic features of the BoXS are avail-
able on the homepage and demonstrate how to do the most common
tasks using the BoXS.
4.3 The BoXS Programming Language
In this section I describe the thought process behind the design decisions met
concerning the BoXS Programming Language (BoXSPL). The goal of the
BoXSPL is to create a language which is easy to learn for novice users while
still allowing the implementation of most experiment types. This section
intends to provide an overview of the BoXSPL. For more information on the
commands and concepts described in this section please refer to the appendix
or the official homepage where more elaborate documentation is available.
4.3.1 Code Based and Graphical Approaches
While most professional programming languages like C++ and Java are
purely text based programming languages, languages designed for novice
programmers like z-Tree or Regate provide strong graphical user interfaces
for designing a program. The advantage of graphical approaches is that
they may be easier to learn and less intimidating for novice users as stan-
dard experiment types like questionnaires can often be created without even
writing a single line of code. In more complex experiments, however, the
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experimenter is usually required to write program code at some point either
way.
Text based languages provide advantages for advanced users as it is usu-
ally faster to type a desired command using the keyboard than to create it
using a graphical interface. Sophisticated users may furthermore take ad-
vantage of features like copying and pasting and are free to choose any text
editor they like. Another advantage of text based languages is that their
programs can be easily shared and archived, as they are compatible across
versions and platforms, or published, as they can be easily printed.
With the BoXSPL I introduce a text based programming language. In
order to ease the learning curve for novice users I provide a rich documenta-
tion, several sample programs and an editor with syntax highlighting. I also
provide a tutorials and videos to reduce the time and effort required to get
new users started with the BoXS and create a first experiment.
4.3.2 Program Execution
This section describes how the BoXS server processes a program written by
an experimenter and how it is executed.
Lexing and Parsing
In computer science, a lexical analyser (lexer) is an algorithm which reads
a given text string and translates it into a set of tokens, for example string
tokens, numbers and operators3. These tokens are then handed over to a
syntactic analyser (parser), which analyses and structures the tokens and, as
a final step, arranges and translates them to a format which can be executed4.






simple lexing/parsing-algorithm was implemented. As the complexity of the
language increased and more test cases were created, the stability, quality
and performance of the lexing/parsing process has been steadily enhanced
and improved. An alternative to hand-made lexers are so-called lexer- and
parser-generators for Java, for example JLex and CUP5, which are freely
available. These generators process a given language specification, which
can be enhanced and changed later on, and create lexer- and parser-code
which can be included in any program.
The main advantage of using a such a professional lexer/parser generator
is the high reliability and robustness of the resulting algorithm. Furthermore
it simplifies the future documentation and enhancement of the underlying
language specification. In the long run the transition to a lexing/parser
generator seems advantageous. However, as the required changes would likely
incur a lot of initial instability as the lexing/parsing process is vital for the
BoXS, the migration process has a relatively low priority at the moment.
Internal Implementation
Lexing, parsing and execution are done in several steps. An overview of the
classes involved in the process is shown in figure 4.6. First, the complete
program is partitioned based on the matching and flow control commands
(if, for and while) contained in it. In the next step, the resulting code
is scanned line by line and translated into corresponding Function-objects.
These objects are then filled with the data required for their proper execution
at runtime.
For instance, the line var=round(15/4+6) is translated into the following
tree-like structure:




Note: Some attributes, operations and classes are omitted from the diagram in order to
improve readability.
Figure 4.6: Class diagram of the lexing/parsing classes.
OperationNodeDouble:4.0),OperationNodeDouble:6.0)))
The FunctionAssign-object, which is on top of the hierarchy, assigns a value
to the variable named var. In order to calculate the correct value for this it
executes the OperationNodeRound-object which in turn executes and eval-
uates objects further down in the hierarchy.
As a result of the lexing/parsing process, a program which is entered
as a text string is converted into a vector of Function-objects, which can
each reference one or more related Function-objects. In the first versions
of the BoXS this conversion, which is arguably the most computationally
intensive and complex process in the BoXS, was done while the experiment
was running. In order to improve performance this process is now done before
the experiment is executed, which vastly improves the execution performance
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in more complex experiments. At runtime, the BoXS calls the execute-
methods of all Function-objects, which are implemented as very fast and
efficient operations.
In order to ensure the proper functioning of the BoXS lexer/parser a suit
of critical test terms and expressions has been collected which is executed
and tested before a change is incorporated into the official BoXS server.
Every time an internal error in the BoXS is found, a corresponding expres-
sion is added to this test collection in order to ensure that this error is not
accidentally reintroduced in a future version.
Error Handling
Unfortunately not all programs written by experimenters are flawless. There
are two categories of errors which can occur when executing a user-written
program. The first category contains so-called compile-time errors which
prevent the program from being lexed and parsed correctly, for instance
misspelled commands, missing brackets or other types of syntax errors. The
second category consists of so-called runtime errors which occur and can only
be detected while the program is executed, for example the referencing of
undefined variables or an invalid mathematical operation.
Both compile-time and runtime errors which occur when running a pro-
gram in the BoXS are reported to the experimenter and displayed in a sepa-
rate window, including the line which caused the error. Error messages serve
the purpose of informing the experimenter about mistakes in her program
and making her aware of possible implications.
When compile-time errors are encountered, the BoXS only shows the er-
ror message and does not start the experiment. When runtime-errors occur,
the philosophy of the BoXS is to keep the experiment running whenever pos-
sible and only halt the execution for subjects who are directly affected by
the error.
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display("Please enter your age:")
inputNumber(age)
assert(age>=10 && age<=100)
display("Please enter your gender:")
choice(gender,"male","female")
wait()
Figure 4.7: Example questionnaire.
Furthermore two specific types of possible errors do not raise error mes-
sages: 1) Referencing an undefined variable does not result in an error but
returns the numerical value 0. The rationale for this is that it makes pro-
grams significantly shorter by eliminating the need to initialise every variable
(for example counter=0). 2) Some questionable mathematical expressions,
for instance var=1/0, does not result in an error message but in the pseudo-
value Infty (infinity), which may produce odd results when used for further
calculations.
4.3.3 Implemented Functionality
One important process in creating a programming language is to find the
right compromise between its accessibility and its generality. While a simple
language with only a few commands might be very appealing to novice users,
a lack of functionality would narrow down its possible applications.
Before a description of the functions implemented in the BoXSPL is
provided, consider the questionnaire example program shown in figure 4.7
for an impression of how a typical BoXS-program looks. A typical program
includes display-commands to display instructions and questions, includes
some input commands like inputNumber and choice and ends with a wait-
command.
Figure 4.8 shows the set of functions which are implemented in the first
version of the BoXS Programming Language (BoXSPL) grouped by function.
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Figure 4.8: List of all functions implemented in the BoXS.
The functions allow for most experiment types and questionnaires. Each
function is designed to have a clear purpose and be easy to understand.
4.3.4 Basic Calculus
On the most basic level the BoXSPL includes the most common mathemat-
ical functions as well as string concatenation. It can evaluate arithmetic
expressions, calculate with integer and real numbers at double precision and
understands the use of brackets. Furthermore the BoXS can generate uni-
formly and normally distributed pseudo-random numbers based on the linear
congruential generator implemented in Java6. It also provides program flow
control commands in the form of an if-command for conditional execution





The BoXS provides a very flexible data structure which allows for variables
with different scopes, i.e. local, group-specific and global types, as well as
arrays and matrices of arbitrary dimensions.
Internal Data Representation
The BoXS uses a so-called HashMap-object to store all data generated by
each experiment as it provides a very flexible way of data storage. A map
in computer science is a general data structure which can store an arbitrary
number of key-value pairs. The HashMap-class, as provided by the Java
programming language, provides a very efficient implementation of such a
map by generating hash codes for each key in order to reduce the time
required to access stored data.
The keys used in this map are the variable names, which are stored as
a string, and the corresponding values are arbitrary objects. In the current
version these objects are either strings or double precision numbers. In future
versions this might be used to store more complex objects like lists or images.
Local, Group and Global Variables
In order to ensure that all data is stored unambiguously, a variable name
needs to be transformed and resolved internally before a variable is stored.
The variable name payoff, for example, would be problematic as it would
be unclear to which subject the payoff belongs. In order to avoid this, each
variable name is internally prefixed by the respective subject's username ,
which is always unique7 for each experiment8.
7The server always ensures that the usernames of the subjects are unique. If several
subjects login with the same username, they are renamed internally by adding the suffix
_<number>.
8In the first versions of the BoXS, variable names stored in the format of
group.role.varname. This turned out to be problematic, however, as the re-matching
of subjects would lead to all variables getting mixed up.
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(Suppose there is one group (1) with two subjects (S1 and S2) in roles A and B.)
Assignment for ... Program Line Internal Representation
... current subject var=5 S1.var=5
... subject A in current group A.var=5 S1.var=5
... subject B in current group B.var=5 S2.var=5
... subject B in current group 1 1.B.var=5 S2.var=5
... all subjects in current group *.var=5 S1.var=5, S2.var=5
... all subjects in group 1 1.*.var=5 S1.var=5, S2.var=5
... all subjects in all groups *.*.var=5 S1.var=5, S2.var=5
Table 4.1: Local, group and global variable examples.
(Suppose there is one group (1) with two subjects (S1 and S2) in roles A and B.)
Program Line Internal Representation
specific index var[3]=5 S1.var[3]=5
calculated index var[1+2]=5 S1.var[3]=5
string index var[A]=5 S1.var[A]=5
string index hello[german]=Willkommen... S1.hello[german]=...
variable index var[experimentround]=5 S1.var[3]=5
variable index var[role]=5 S1.var[A]=5
3-dimensional var[1][2][3]=5 S1.var[1][2][3]=5
Table 4.2: Array and matrix examples.
If no specific prefix is specified by the experimenter, a variable is treated
as a local variable which means that it only applies to the current subject.
Therefore the line payoff=5 only sets the current subject's payoff to 5. In
order to change another players variables or to do group-specific or global9
changes a prefix has to be used. This allows the experimenter to create
pseudo-global variables and share variables among subjects. Table 4.1 shows
some examples how this can be done in the BoXSPL.
Arrays and Matrices
The BoXSPL allows arrays and matrices of arbitrary dimension to be stored.
Table 4.2 shows some examples of what can be done with this.
The reason why the BoXS is so flexible with respect to arrays is that
they are not stored as arrays internally. They are stored in the very same
HashMap where all data is stored. The array indices are evaluated at runtime
9Note that this so-called global level is specific to the current realm. Cross-realm
communication is not possible for obvious security reasons.
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and appended to the variable name. In effect, a one-dimensional array with
a length of 5 is stored like 5 separate simple variables.
Arrays do not need to be defined ahead of time and their dimensions
can be arbitrarily changed at runtime. Furthermore both number and string
indices are allowed, which is very useful in some situations.
Automatically Generated Variables
The BoXS automatically creates several variables during the execution of an
experiment. While some of these variables are only required for the internal
execution process, some variables may be interesting for experimenters. Most
automatically generated variables are prefixed with _ in order to avoid
confusion.
• _linenum: The number of the line in the program which is currently
being executed (usually a wait-command).
• _finished: 1 if the experiment has finished for this subject, 0 other-
wise.
• _continue<linenumber>: 1 if the subject has clicked successfully on
the wait-button specified in the given line, 0 otherwise.
• _clientdisplaytime<linenumber>: The exact time10 at which a stage
was displayed on the respective subject's screen. This may be useful
for experimenters in order to synchronise the BoXS to other devices
based on the time. The line number specifies the wait-command which
triggered the stage in question.
• _inputhistory_<varname>: This variable stores every input made by
the subjects. This allows the experimenter to learn about the decision




process and possible choice revisions, as well as the response times.
The data is stored as a comma-separated string where each action is
formatted as <time>.<input> and where time is the number of mil-
liseconds since the current stage was displayed on the subject's screen
and input is the value entered by the subject at that time. This fea-
ture can be disabled using the disableInputHistory()-command if
the data is not required.
4.3.6 Displaying Information and User Input
An experiment software needs to enable the experimenter to both present
instructions or questions on the subjects' screens as well as receive their
input. In the BoXSPL several commands are available to achieve this.
Each command is processed on the server by evaluating variables and
solving calculations and distributed to the clients where it triggers the cre-
ation of a corresponding graphical components like a text boxes or a buttons.
After creating all components for a screen they are, by default, vertically
aligned and displayed. In general the BoXS client tries to recycle compo-
nents and realise each stage with as few changes as required in order to
increase the performance and reduce possible flicker effects in experiments
where the information to be displayed changes frequently, for example in
market experiments.
In case the components do not fit the screen's height, a vertical scrollbar
is displayed, which allows the subjects to view components which do not fit
on the screen. Horizontal scrollbars are not shown.
Displaying Text and Graphics
For displaying instructions, graphics and other types of data the BoXSPL
provides the display-command. The display-command, as well as several
other commands, supports the Hyper-Text Mark-up Language (HTML) and
157
(a) Text formatting (b) Enumerations and lists
(c) Images (d) Tables
Figure 4.9: Examples using the display-command.
provides a great amount of flexibility.
The HTML format, which is also used for website programming, is both
popular, flexible and relatively easy to learn. Besides simple text, HTML
allows for text formatting, lists, enumerations, tables and images. The image
formats which can be used include the standard formats JPEG and PNG as
well as animated GIFs which can be used for displaying moving images on the
subject's screen. Figure 4.9 shows some examples of what can be achieved
by using HTML formatting.
By default, a modern style using sans-serif fonts and a compact layout
is used in the BoXS, which is likely sufficient for most experimenters. If
required, more advanced experimenters can use advanced Cascading Style
Sheet (CSS) formatting to further customize the BoXS's appearance. CSS
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(a) Formulas (b) Charts
Figure 4.10: More examples using the display-command.
code can either be used within a display-command, which changes the ap-
pearance for this exact element, or globally by using the style-command,
which is not discussed in this document.
Since the BoXS is usually run over the internet, several kinds of services
which are available on the internet can be used within an experiment to gain
access to additional functionality. In the example program shown in figure
4.10 this is used to include a mathematical formula, which is generated from
TEX-code using a Google service, as well as a chart based on data generated
in an experiment and visualised using the Google Chart API11.
Videos
The BoXSPL also includes an experimental video-command which can be
used to include video and audio files into an experiment. In order to use it
the experimenter needs to provide a video or audio file in a format that is
compatible to the Java Media Framework (JMF)12. Using the JMF has the
advantage of true platform-compatibility but unfortunately also introduces
some restrictions.





access the Java Media Framework, which has to be specified when starting
the clients and can slow down the starting process significantly. Second, the
video and audio codecs supported by the JMF are not very satisfying as they
only support relatively dated and inefficient compression algorithms, which
leads to poor video quality, a big transfer size or both. Third, the default
Java security settings are very strict and forbid applets to access local videos
which requires the the experimenter to edit the Java security settings on
each subjects' computer13.
For the above reasons the video-command is to be considered experi-
mental at this stage and its use is generally discouraged. Moving pictures
without sound can be easily achieved using animated GIFs in the display-
command.
Unfortunately the basic problems regarding the JMF is not likely to be
solved in the near future. However, as the HTML format is currently being
expanded to include video, it is likely that future versions of Java may deliver
a less complicated way to use videos.
Subject Input
The current version the BoXSPL provides four commands for requesting
subject input, that is the inputString- and inputNumber-commands for
string and numerical input, as well as the choice- and a checkbox-commands
for selections. These commands create appropriate graphical components on
the subject's screen and send every input made by a subject to the server
where it is processed. A list of all available input commands as well as
documentation on their usage is provided in the appendix.




When executing an experiment the BoXS continues until it encounters a
wait-command. When a wait-command is encountered all previous state-
ments in the program are executed and displayed to the subject, as well as
a 'continue'-button. The experiment execution is then halted until the sub-
ject enters the required information of the respective stage and clicks on the
'continue'-button. The assert-command can be used to specify additional
restrictions, for example a maximum value for an input variable.
Besides the wait-command the BoXSPL includes a waitTime-command,
which waits for a specific time, a waitForExperimenter-command, which
waits until the experimenter clicks on a button and a waitForPlayers-
command, which waits until all subjects of a subject group have clicked
on their respective 'continue'-buttons.
4.3.7 Matching
Matching is the process by which an experiment system assigns subjects to
groups and gives them roles which are unique for each group. In an economic
trust game, for example, the subjects would be partitioned into groups of
two where each group designates one subject as the 'investor' and the other
subject as the 'trustee'.
The most basic matching type which is provided by the BoXS is the
manual matching (matchManual(username,group,role)), which allows the
experimenter to precisely specify a group and a role for each subject. While
this approach allows for the most customisation, it becomes increasingly
messy and impractical as the number of subjects in an experiment increases.
The second and most common matching type is the alphabetical match-
ing (matchAll(roles)), which sorts the subjects based on their user names
and assigns them in alphabetic order. The experimenter only needs to specify
the names of the roles and the BoXS automatically creates as many groups
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as possible. Note that the subjects are always assigned to the same groups
if they are rematched using the same command.
Some experiment designs require a so-called stranger matching which
ensures that subjects are matched to random subjects in subsequent parts
of the experiment. The so-called perfect stranger matching furthermore re-
quires that a subject is never matched into a group which contains a previ-
ous 'group-mate'. The BoXS provides the matchStranger(roles)- and the
matchPerfectStranger(roles)-commands to execute these types of match-
ing.
A perfect stranger matching requires a surprisingly high amount of cal-
culation in order to determine the matching order which guarantees the
most possible matches. Due to this computational complexity the BoXS
uses matching tables, which drastically reduces the time required for the
matching but restricts the matching to combinations which have been pre-
calculated. A list of all pre-calculated perfect stranger matches is provided
in section 4.A.6 in the appendix of this chapter.
The matching specified by any of the above matching commands is pre-
served until the matchClear()-command is called. Afterwards a new match-
ing can be started.
If no matching is specified by the experimenter, the BoXS by default
assigns all subjects into groups with one player each.
4.4 Design and Implementation
This section describes the technical aspects of the Bonn Experiment System
(BoXS). In the first part of this section I discuss basic decisions made in
designing the Bonn Experiment System, that is the choices of the program-
ming language, the network architecture and the communication protocol.
The following sections describe how both the server and the client of the
BoXS have been designed and how they work internally.
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4.4.1 Programming Language
The task of a programming language is to allow human programmers to write
computer programs which can then be translated (compiled) to a native for-
mat which is executable by computers. Today several hundred programming
languages exist, each designed to satisfy certain needs, for example high per-
formance, platform independence or the support of complex scientific func-
tions14.
The most popular and mature programming languages which are used
for application programming at the time of writing this chapter are C++,
Visual Basic and Java.
C++, first designed in 1979 by Bjarne Stroustrup, is probably the most
widely used programming language for applications and video games today.
Program code written in C++ can be compiled for most platforms and usu-
ally performs very well. However, the program code has to be specifically
compiled into native code and distributed for every target platform. For
example, a program compiled for Microsoft Windows can not be executed
under Linux or MacOS, or even on some other Windows versions.
Visual Basic is developed by Microsoft and is designed to be easier to use
than C++. At the same time it is the most restrictive programming language
as programs developed using it are restricted to the Microsoft Windows
operating system and can not be used on other platforms.
Java, which was first published by Sun in 1995 is based on the Write
Once, Run Anywhere-philosophy, which allows the programmer to write
and compile a program once and execute it on every platform. In order to
make this work Java programs are not compiled to native code but to an
intermediate byte code. This byte code is then executed by the so-called Java
Virtual Machine, which is available for almost all platforms. Today Java




is very popular, especially for internet applications, and the Java Virtual
Machine, which is required for executing Java applications, is pre-installed
on most computers and can be installed for free otherwise.
One common misconception about Java is that it is slower than other
languages because of the additional translation process required during the
program execution. While this criticism was justified for early Java versions,
the modern Java Virtual Machines have become much faster and perform
just-in-time-compilation, which means that the parts of the program which
are most important for its performance are automatically compiled into na-
tive code at runtime15.
The BoXS uses Java as the programming language for both the server and
the clients in order to ensure full cross-platform compatibility, even within
the same experiment. This has the advantage that it allows the BoXS to be
used in internet environments. It also allows laboratories using the BoXS to
freely choose the operating system for its computers, for example allowing
the use of open operating systems like Linux, which may be used to reduce
the costs required to set-up and administrate the laboratory computers.
4.4.2 Network Architecture
There are two approaches to design a network architecture. The client-server
approach designates one central server computer to which all so-called clients
connect. If clients want to share information in this architecture, they have
to send it to the server, which then processes and/or distributes it to the
appropriate receivers. The peer-to-peer approach tries to minimise the role
of the server and emphasises direct connections between different clients. It
has become very popular for file sharing as it provides a high bandwidth and
reduces the need for powerful and costly servers. In general, the peer-to-peer




approach does allow a higher bandwidth as well as a slightly lower latency.
The BoXS uses a client-server architecture for reasons similar to the
ones described in Fischbacher (2007). First of all, the need for a server
in an experiment system is hard to eliminate as subject registration, the
matching of the subjects, the distribution of the experiment programs and
the collection of the resulting data are intrinsically central processes and are
best implemented using a server. While it would be possible to add peer-
to-peer elements to the network architecture, the slight advantages in speed
would probably not justify the resulting increases in complexity and effort.
High bandwidth is not an important requirement for most experiments and
the latency is usually low enough in the client-server approach to be hardly
noticeable both in local networks and over the internet.
Basically the network structure resembles that of z-Tree with one ex-
ception. While the z-Tree program (as opposed to the z-Leaf) includes the
server as well as the experimenters' user interface, the two roles are separated
in the BoXS. The BoXS server, which is described below, can therefore be
executed either on the experimenters' computer or on a separate computer,
for example on the official server.
4.4.3 Communication Protocol
The internet and most local networks support two major communication pro-
tocols. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and its extension TCP/IP
are widely used for most internet applications like web browsing and sending
emails. It provides a high degree of reliability and guarantees the arrival
of the transmitted data packages between sender and receiver in the right
order. The disadvantage of TCP/IP is that it incurs a significant latency,
especially if packages become corrupted or delayed16. The User Datagram




Protocol (UDP), as opposed to the TCP, does not guarantee the correct or-
der or even the correct arrival of data packages. Instead it provides a fast
transmission speed and a low latency. The UDP is widely used for real-time
applications like live audio or video streams and online games. The reason-
ing for this is that for a game or a voice transmission a missing package may
not be perceived as bad as a constant lag which would result in a delayed
playback17.
Java supports both TCP and UDP sockets and connections. As commu-
nication based on the UDP protocol does not guarantee the correct arrival of
sent packages, the programmer using it has to provide additional algorithms
to account for cases in which packages were transmitted erroneously. Pack-
ages would have to be checked on arrival, unordered packages would have to
be sorted and missing packages would have to be requested and sent again.
As the correct and robust implementation of these functions is both tedious
and non-trivial, using the TCP protocol was the obvious choice for the BoXS.
Besides convenience, it is questionable if programming a secure data connec-
tion based on UDP can improve upon the corresponding mechanisms which
are already implemented in the TCP.
The Bonn Experiment System uses two connections between the server
and each client. While one connection for each client would be sufficient for
both directions in principle, experience in developing the BoXS has shown
that both performance, stability and latency of the connections can be im-
proved by using separate connections for both directions as they allow for
asynchronous data transmission.





The main task of the server is to keep track of all its connected clients,
to ensure the correct transmission of data within the system and recover
connections in case of connection issues. Additionally the server has to parse
and execute experiment programs, correctly match and assign subjects to the
correct experiment sessions and provide a way for experimenters to control
and manage their experiments.
One key feature of the BoXS is that it provides official servers which can
be accessed over the internet and eliminate the need for experimenters to
run and administrate their own server. In order to make this possible and
attractive the server has to meet particularly strong requirements concerning
robustness and security.
Server Robustness
In order to ensure the highest robustness possible, I decided to implement the
BoXS as a highly multi-threaded architecture. A thread in programming is
a part of a process which can be executed separately18. Programs can create
several threads which are then 'forked' and executed independent from each
other and at the same time.
One major advantage of using threads is that the crash of one thread
does not necessarily affect the other threads. Furthermore multi-threaded
programs take advantage of modern computer processors, which possess mul-
tiple processor cores and have the potential to run much faster as a result.
The downside of multi-threading is that it requires a lot of sophisticated pro-
gramming techniques to ensure that the threads are synchronised correctly
and do not disturb each other or incur non-deterministic behaviour.
In the case of the BoXS server the main process's only task is to wait for




and accept incoming connection attempts from clients. After a client con-
nects successfully, all subsequent communication is handled by a communica-
tion thread which is immediately forked and started. Additional threads are
forked for each experiment and each subjects' role in an experiment. There-
fore the malfunctioning of one thread can effect neither the vital functions
of the server nor the execution of other experiments.
In order to ensure that the resources of the server are shared evenly
across the different experiments, several mechanisms are in place to detect
and interrupt programs which get trapped in an infinite loop and consume
too much processing power as a result.
So far the server program has proven to be very reliable. It should be
noted, however, that no severe stress tests have been done to date. If many
experiments with high levels of interaction were to run at the same time,
the speed of the server might decrease and the available memory might get
depleted. For such experiments the use of a separate server is recommended.
Connection Robustness
One worrying thought might be that subjects or even the experimenter tem-
porarily lose their internet connection during an experiment. While the
mechanisms described in the previous section already ensure that this does
not affect the remaining subjects, the thought of the subjects' data being
lost is not pleasing.
The BoXS offers the possibility to reconnect both subjects and experi-
menters who lost their connection and resume the experiment at almost the
exact same position where they left. In order to do this, the BoXS suspends
and stores each client session which gets interrupted during an experiment
for up to 24 hours. When a client tries to connect to the BoXS and provides
realm and subject ids which match those of a suspended session, the session
gets reassigned to the client and resumed. The server then ensures that the
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reconnected subjects' clients are updated by sending them the most recent
experiment state.
Security
Both experiment designs and experiment results contain a lot confidential
data both from the experimenter and from the subjects. This is especially
important for the BoXS as it a) uses the internet as its medium, b) several
experimenters work on the same server at the same time and c) the subjects
use the same software client as the experimenter.
The first mechanism implemented to ensure that this data cannot be ac-
cessed by unauthorized persons is the so-called realm id, which is a string or
a number specified by the experimenter at the beginning of the experiment.
This exact realm id has to be entered on every other computer which is
intended to enter the experiment. This ensures that the subjects and exper-
imenters as well as the corresponding data of different experiments do not
get mixed up.
The second mechanism is an experimenter password which can be spec-
ified by the experimenter and ensures that only the experimenter creating
the realm or someone entrusted with the password can access the subjects'
clients and their data.
Limitations While these two mechanisms provide sufficient security for
most environments, experimenters should be aware that no extensive security
checks were done on the BoXS.
In the current version of the BoXS data is transmitted between the server
and the clients without being encrypted, which might allow a man-in-the-
middle attack by a sufficiently sophisticated and motivated hacker.
Additional security features might be implemented in future versions of
the BoXS.
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Note: Some attributes, operations and classes are omitted from the diagram in order to
improve readability.
Figure 4.11: Class diagram of the main server classes.
Notes on the Implementation
Figure 4.11 shows a Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagram of the most
important server classes. The main process is the main()-function of the
Server-class, which is called when the server is started and opens the TCP
ports 58000 and 58001 in order to wait for incoming connections. Whenever
a client connects to both of these ports, a ServerClientThread is created,
forked from the main process and started.
The ServerClientThread-object provides all functions required for the
server to communicate with a specific client and manages the login process
as well as the information about the connected client, which is stored in
a SubjectInfo-object. While being executed, the ServerClientThread-object
waits for and processes data sent by the client as it arrives, for example input
generated by the subject or an experimenter's program.
Whenever an experiment is started by an experimenter, a Session-object
is created which contains both the experiment program as a string as well
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as a variable space in which all data generated by the experiment is stored.
The Session-object also contains the matching methods which create Group-
objects and fill them with available subjects based on a specified matching
rule.
4.4.5 The Client
The client is the software which runs on both the experimenters' and the
subjects' computers and is designed to provide an easily usable interface
for both experimenters and subjects. For experimenters it must provide
the means to write, execute and supervise an experiment, as well as the
possibility to receive and store data generated by an experiment. For subjects
it must graphically display the current stage of the experiment, as specified
by its experimenter's program, as well as receive and transmit the user input
generated by the subject to the server, where it is processed. Note that both
the experimenter and the subject clients are reliant on their connection to
the server to fulfil their task.
Implementation as Java Applet
As one aim of this project is to make the system as universal and flexible
as possible, the client software is implemented using the Java Programming
Language, more specifically as a Java Applet. As previously described, the
Java Programming Language allows the generation of program code which
can be run on every operating system and every platform. Figure 4.12 shows
the same client running in different environments and on different operating
systems.
An applet is a program which can be executed within a web browser
without prior installation. Java is the most common choice for programming
applets and is supported by most internet browsers and used by many web
sites to provide advanced functionality ranging from small tools like stock
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(a) Desktop PC, Ubuntu Linux
(b) Netbook, Windows
(c) MacBook, MacOS
Figure 4.12: The BoXS client.
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and news tickers to large applications like text and spreadsheet applications
or even games.
In the case of the BoXS, implementing the clients as Java applets allows
them to be run on every operating system and every type of device as long as
they have an internet connection and an internet browser supporting Java19,
both of which are available on most computers.
Several applets can be executed at the same time, not only on the same
computer but even within the same web page. This allows multiple instances
to be run side-by-side, which is useful for testing in the BoXS as several
subject applets can be easily simulated at once.
In the case of the BoXS, both the experimenters and the subjects use
the same client applet. Whether the applet belongs to an experimenter or
a subject is evaluated at runtime based on the user name and on whether
the password provided by the user is correct. The size of the applet is
approximately 80 KB which is sufficiently small to be loaded without delay
on most computers.
Internal Implementation
Figure 4.13 displays an UML diagram of the client classes. The main class for
the clients is the ClientApplet-class, an object of which is created for every
BoXS client applet that is started. Alternatively it is possible to start the
BoXS as an independent program without a surrounding internet browser
by executing the ClientFrame's main()-function. In this case a window is
created which contains a ClientApplet-object and behaves like an applet
otherwise.
The ClientApplet-object manages both the internal behaviour of the
19At the time of writing this chapter, most web browsers designed for desktop PCs and
notebooks already support Java. While this is not necessarily true for mobile devices
yet, it is very likely that full Java support arrives within the next few years as both
the computational power of these devices as well as their operating systems are quickly
advancing.
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Note: Some attributes, operations and classes are omitted from the diagram in order to
improve readability.
Figure 4.13: Class diagram of the main client classes.
client as well as its graphical representation. When started it tries to con-
nect to the BoXS server and either displays an experimenter's graphical
user interface, as specified by the ExperimenterPanel-class, or a subject's
user interface, depending on the login data. The ClientApplet also creates
a ClientConnection-object which is the client analogue to the ServerClient-
Thread and handles the connection between the client and the server.
The diagram also shows the objects used for the server-client communica-
tion in both directions. The SubjectInfo-object contains information about a
subject's identity and its current status. The ServerSideValid-object is sent
by the server to signal whether the input made by a subject is valid. An
ErrorMessage-object contains information on the line and the description
of an error which was detected while parsing or executing a program. The
ServerCommand is the only object sent from a client to the server and is
used to start or cancel an experiment as well as to submit values entered by
a subject.
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4.5 Limitations and Future Development
I have received a lot of feedback and was able to implement most of the
proposed features and improve many aspects of the Bonn Experiment System
based on it. While I highly appreciate this feedback, I am unfortunately not
able to implement all proposals made.
4.5.1 Feature Selection
The obvious reason is that every additional feature and every change requires
a significant amount of time and effort to implement, document and test.
Especially the latter should not be underestimated as even a slight change
can have widespread effects which are often hard to anticipate. In order
to decide whether a certain feature is implemented, I try to estimate the
likely number of affected users (Is every experimenter affected or only a very
small subset?), the severity of the lack of the feature (Does it make some
experiment designs infeasible or is it merely an inconvenience?) as well as
the expected implementation effort (Is it done in two hours or two weeks?).
Another reason why I am hesitant to implement some proposals is that
every new feature adds to the overall complexity of the system. One of the
major advantages of the Bonn Experiment System is that it allows a large
number of experiments while requiring the experimenter only to learn a small
set of commands. The more buttons, commands and tweaking possibilities
a system has, the harder and more intimidating it might become.
4.5.2 Future Development
Obviously it is hard to predict how the development of the BoXS advances
in the future. I am dedicated to get the current version error free and intend
to continue developing it in the future. If I will no longer be able to support
and maintain the BoXS any further, I will try to find a way to ensure possible
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further development, either by publishing the software as open source or by
handing it over to another researcher or programmer willing to take care of
its future development.
4.5.3 Limitations
There are several features which were already requested and have made it to
the wish list for future versions.
• Functions: Currently it is not possible for experimenters to create user-
defined functions and procedures. While this is not very relevant for
short experiments, the lack of user-defined functions can lead to un-
necessarily long and messy programs in some cases, for example if the
randomisation of stages is required.
• External devices: At the moment the BoXS offers no possibility to
connect external devices like for example medical devices and input
devices like joysticks.
• Delay: A slight lag exists between the execution of the program on
a server and the point in time when it is displayed on the subjects'
screens. While this lag is usually sufficiently small for non-time-critical
experiments, it may be of importance for some experiments.
4.6 Conclusion
The Bonn Experiment System provides a novel and attractive way of design-
ing and conducting laboratory and internet experiments. The possibilities
to easily set-up and run experiments over the internet, to include web based
content as well as advanced features like the measurement of response times
allow for many new and exciting experiment designs and environments.
The possibility to execute the BoXS client applets without prior installa-
tion eases the set-up in lab environments and allows for experiments which
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use existing infrastructure outside labs, including the subjects' computers.
True cross-platform compatibility provides freedom of choice and possible
support for mobile devices in the future.
The programming language BoXSPL is easy to use and easy to learn. The
small number of commands as well as the available online documentations,
tutorials and sample programs make the learning process easy for novice
users and provide rich possibilities for advanced users. Several experiments
have been conducted using the BoXS and the feedback received from the
experimenters was very positive.
One exciting and unexpected example for how the BoXS expands the
space of experiment possibilities was provided by a kind professor who wrote
me about how he used the BoXS in his lecture to teach about experimental
methods by programming ad-hoc experiments together with his students
who could participate using their laptops.
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4.A List of all Functions in the BoXS Programming
Language
4.A.1 Basic Operations and Calculations
Basic Calculus
The BoXS compiler correctly evaluates +,-,/,* and the modulus (%). It also
correctly derives the priority from brackets as required.
Example
More Calculus and Trigonometric Functions
The BoXS can calculate the natural logarithm (log), as well as the expo-
nential function (exp), sine (sin), cosine (cos) and tangent (tan). It also




The BoXS can check for equality (==), inequality (!=) and compare (<,>,<=,>=).




• The BoXS internally uses the number 0 as false while the number 1 is
treated as true.
Random Number Generation




• The random numbers are different for each subject. If they are sup-
posed to be the same, they can be assigned to global variables.
• The numbers are generated using the internal Java random number
generator, which is based on a linear congruential generator and pro-
duces pseudo-random numbers.
4.A.2 Program Flow Control
if(expression) { ... }
Tests if the expression is fulfilled (i.e. not equal to zero) and executes the
code in brackets only if the expression is met.
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Parameters
expression The expression which must be fulfilled.
Notes
• Note that each curly bracket needs to be in a single line of code.
while(expression) { ... }
The while-command executes a part of your program repeatedly for as long
as a given expression is fulfilled (i.e. not equal to zero). Compared to the
for-command it is slightly more versatile.
Parameters





• Note that each curly bracket needs to be in a single line of code.
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• In order to avoid infinite loops, execution is aborted when too many
repetitions occur. An error message is given in this case.
for(initialization; condition; iteration) { ... }
The for-command executes a part of your program repeatedly for as long as
a given expression is fulfilled. Compared to the while-command it is usually
more compact and easier to use.
Parameters
initialization Initialization code which is executed before the
loop. Usually this is used to initialize a counting
variable.
condition The expression which must be fulfilled for the loop
to be continued. Usually this is used to check if
the counting value exceeds the number of desired
repetitions.
iteration Code which is executed after each repetition.






• Note that each curly bracket needs to be in a single line of code.
• In order to avoid infinite loops, execution is aborted when too many
repetitions occur. An error message is given in this case.
4.A.3 Displaying Text and Graphics
display([message])
The display-command shows a message on the subject's screen. Due to its
support of HTML commands it is very versatile and can be used to display
most types of information.
Parameters
message The message to be displayed. The message can
be both a constant string or a variable which is







• This command supports full HTML-syntax for formatting the output
if required. You can also use CSS formatting.
• You can include local and remote images (including animated GIFs).
You can also use internet services like e.g. Google Charts to include
additional functionality to your programs.




The wait-command creates a button on each subject's display. The exper-
iment does not continue for the subject until the button is pressed. If the
current subject screen requires the subject to do something, for example
enter a number, the button is disabled until she does so.
Parameters
message The message to be displayed on the button. If
no parameter is given, a standard message is dis-
played (Continue).
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messageafterclick The message to be displayed after the subject
clicked on the button. If no parameter is given,
a standard message is displayed (Please wait for
the experiment to continue).
Example
Notes
• The button is only enabled (i.e. 'clickable') when all assertions are
fulfilled and all required input elements are filled out.
• The wait-command is subject specific. When a subject clicks on the
wait button, the experiment continues for this subject even if the other
subjects have not finished yet.
waitForPlayers([message],[messageafterclick])
The waitForPlayers-command is similar to the wait-Command. The dif-
ference is that the experiment only continues after this command when all
subjects of the a subject's group have pressed the button. This command
can be used to synchronise groups of subjects before experiment parts which
require each subject to have reached a certain point in the program.
Parameters See wait.
waitTime(time)
The waitTime-command halts the execution of the program for the specified
time.
Parameters
time The time the program waits in milliseconds (!).
Notes
• No button or message is displayed for the subjects which would indicate
that the experiment is waiting for a certain time. You might want to
point this out in the instructions in order to avoid confusion.
184
waitForExperimenter()
Sometimes the experimenter needs the experiment to wait until he has done
something, for example until she has explained the next stage to the subjects.
The waitForExperimenter-command halts the execution of the experiment
for all subjects until the experimenter presses the 'Ready'-button on the
experimenter's client.
Notes
• No button or message is displayed for the subjects which would indicate
that the experiment is waiting for the experimenter. You might want
to point this out in the instructions in order to avoid confusion.
4.A.5 User Input
inputString(variablename)
Displays a text-field in which the subject can enter a value. This value
is stored in a variable with the specified name. The user can type in all
characters, including numbers and foreign characters.
Parameters




• The default text is an empty string. If you want to specify a default,
assign a value to the variable before the inputString-command.
• If you want this command to be non-compulsive, which means that
the subject can continue without entering something, you can use the
inputStringNC-command. The syntax is equivalent.
inputNumber(variablename)
Displays a text-field in which the subject can enter a numeric value. This
value is stored in a variable with the specified name. The BoXS enforces the
entered text to be a natural or real number.
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Parameters




• The default text is an empty string. If you want to specify a default,
assign a value to the variable before the inputNumber-command.
• If the text entered is not a number the text-field is highlighted and the
subject cannot continue until a correct value is entered.
• Both real and integer numbers can be entered.
• If you want this command to be non-compulsive, which means that
the subject can continue without entering something, you can use the
inputNumberNC-command. The syntax is equivalent.
choice(varname,values)
The choice-command displays a group of radio buttons. The user can only
select one option at a time. When the user selects a value, it is stored in a
variable with the specified name.
Parameters
variablename The name of the variable in which the result is
stored.





• By default no option is selected. If you want to specify a default, assign
a value to the variable before the choice-command.
• In some cases it is nice to have the experiment system automatically
randomize the order of the choice options. The choiceRandomize(...)-
function fulfils this role and allows for randomization without addi-
tional programming.
• If you want this command to be non-compulsive, which means that
the subject can continue without entering something, you can use the
choiceNC-command or the choiceRandomizeNC-command. The syn-
tax is equivalent.
checkbox(varname,description)
The check-command displays a single checkbox along with the specified de-
scription. The user can select the checkbox or leave it unchecked. When
the user selects the checkbox, the value 1 is stored in a variable with the
specified name.
Parameters
variablename The name of the variable in which the result is
stored.
description The description shown alongside the checkbox.
Notes
• By default no option is selected. If you want to specify a default, assign
a value to the variable before the choice-command.
• A checkbox is always non-compulsive.
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assert(expression)
The assert-command restricts the subject's possibilities when she is faced
with input fields. Using the assert-command any amount of assertions on
the variables can be added.
Parameters





• If an assertion is violated by user input, the user cannot continue until
she chooses a valid input.
• You can impose multiple assertions on one variable. In this case user
input is only allowed if it satisfies all assertions.
• The assert-command requires a wait/waitForPlayers- or button-command
to have an effect.
• The assert-command does not give specific feedback to the subject on
why she cannot continue when an assertion is violated. Therefore the
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assumptions should be made clear and communicated to the subject
in the experiment instructions and/or the experiment program itself.
style(text)
While the default style is sufficiently attractive for most experiments, ex-
perimenters might run into situations where they need more control over
how things are formatted. The style-command allows to specify a style in
the cascading style sheet (CSS) format which is automatically applied to
all following commands. This style can specify every format aspect ranging
from font name and size up to color, transparency effects, borders etc.. It is
particularly useful for the display commands but also effects buttons etc.
Parameters





• A lot of information on how to create cascading style sheets is available
on the internet.
manualLayout()
By default all components are arranged vertically by the BoXS (automatic
layout). When this is not sufficient, the manualLayout-command can be
used to specify the exact position of each component. While this is sort of
cumbersome, it allows for a great amount of freedom in designing the visual
appearance of an experiment.
In order to do this, the first line of a screen needs to be manualLayout()
in order to disable the automatic layout. Afterwards, display and every
input command take 4 additional parameters which specify the horizontal




• The four additional parameters must be supplied. Otherwise the com-
ponent in question is not displayed.
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• The origin of the coordinate system (0,0) is the top left edge of the
client applet.
• The manualLayout command is only effective for one screen. If the next
screen should follow a manual layout as well the command needs to be
repeated on that screen. Otherwise the BoXS defaults to automatic
layout.
Non-compulsory Input
In some cases it is required to have input components which are non-compulsory,
i.e. the subject should be allowed to proceed even if she did not fill out a
component. An example for this would be a text field for an email address or
a comment, which is optional. In order to allow for this, the BoXS includes
non-compulsory versions of all input commands. These non-compulsory com-







It is possible to specify default values for all input components. In order to
so this one can simply assign a value to the variable in question before the





Matching is the process by which the subjects are assigned to groups and
roles. You can use automatic matching, including (perfect) stranger match-
ing, as well as manual matching.
Notes
• Implicit matching: You do not need to specify matching information.
If you specify no matching information, every subject is automatically
allocated to a separate group and receives the role "A", which is suffi-
cient for experiments which require no interaction among the subjects.
191
matchAll(roles)
The matchAll-command distributes the subjects in alphabetical order of
their username to the desired groups/roles.
Parameters
roles A comma-separated list of all roles.
Example
Notes
• The role names can be letters (A,B,C) or arbitrary strings (investor,
trustee).
matchPerfectStranger(roles)
The matchPerfectStranger-command distributes the subjects to the desired
groups/roles in a way that ensures that no subject are matched to the same
subject again.
Parameters




• Perfect stranger matching is an extremely computationally expensive
operation. Therefore the system uses pre-calculated tables. Use the
following table to figure out how many matches you can achieve given
subject- and rolecount.
• You can only do perfect stranger matching until all possible matches
are use. If you try doing more matches, an error is thrown.
• Use the command matchHistoryClear to reset the perfect stranger
matching algorithm.
• The role names can be letters (A,B,C) or arbitrary strings (investor,
trustee).
matchStranger(roles)
The matchStranger-command distributes the subjects randomly to the de-
sired groups/roles.
Parameters
roles A comma-separated list of all roles.
Notes




By using the matchManual-command you can manually specify how the
subjects are to be matched. Each command matches exactly one subject.
The first argument is the username of the subject which shall be assigned,
the second and third argument are group and role.
Parameters
username The username of the subject which shall be
matched.
group The desired group.
role The desired role.
Example
Notes
• The role names can be letters (A,B,C) or arbitrary strings (investor,
trustee).
• Important: In the most recent version of the BoXS username, group
and role can be variables which vastly expands the possibilities of the
matchManual-command. This implies that the corresponding values




If you want to change the matching at some point in the experiment, use
the matchDone()-command. The experiment halts until all subjects have
reached this point.
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4.B Example BoXS Programs
4.B.1 Questionnaire
This example demonstrates how to implement a simple questionnaire.
4.B.2 Public Good Game
The public good game, as implemented in this example, is a game in which
4 players can contribute a part of their initial endowment to a group project
which benefits everyone. Has a special feature it uses the Google Chart API
in order to graphically display the distribution of the contributions.
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4.B.3 Chat Client
The chat client implemented in this example allows two subjects to send
messages to each other.
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4.B.4 Dutch Auction
In a Dutch auction two subjects watch the price of a good decrease over time
and can buy it at the current price by clicking on the corresponding button.
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4.B.5 Localization
Sometimes an experiment has to work in different languages at the same
time. This example shows an easy way to implement such a feature.
4.B.6 Real Effort Task
In this tedious real effort task subjects have to count the number of ones in
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